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REVISITING "THE RATIONAL BASIS OF
TRADEMARK PROTECTION:"
CONTROL OF QUALITY AND
DILUTION-ESTRANGED
BEDFELLOWS?*
ELIZABETH CUTTER BANNON, J.D., LL.M.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

By 1927 the Industrial Revolution was over and in the United
States modern forms of business had taken command of the marketplace. American jurisprudence was striving to stay abreast of all
the changes brought about by the Revolution. In that year, Frank I.
Schechter's1 article "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection"
was first published. 2 The article advocates that the real function of
a trademark is "to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to
stimulate further purchases by the consuming public," that is, to
assure the public of the quality of the product. 3 From this position,
the argument progresses that the real injury to a trademark is derived from "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
non-competing goods," now referred to as dilution of the trademark.4 The article concludes that the only rational basis for trademark protection is to prevent the above mentioned injury, and that
"the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should consti* Submitted to the Graduate School of The John Marshall Law School in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. Degree in Intellectual
Property.
** The author would like to acknowledge the editorial insight contributed
by Mr. Thomas J. Hoffmann, Mr. Albert Tramposch, Ms. Susan Bruck and Mr.
John Arden.
1. In addition to the article which is the subject of this paper, Mr.
Schechter authored the treatise, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925)[hereinafter SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS] and the articles Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COLUM.

L. REV. 60 (1936) and Trade Morals and Regulations: The American Scene, 6
FORDHAM L. REV. 190 (1937).
2. 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1926-1927), 22 TRADEMARK REP. BULL. 139 (1927),

reprinted in, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970) [hereinafter Schechter, Rational
Basis].
3. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 818, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at

337.
4. Id. at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 342.
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tute the only rational basis for its protection."'5 These ideas contributed to the ongoing revolution of the law and to its goal of
answering the needs and reflecting the changes of society and the
economy. Both the assurance of quality and anti-dilution compo6
nents of Mr. Schechter's theory have entered into our body of law.
But, interestingly enough, they have been embraced separately,
with each part gaining acceptance and legal standing independent

of the other.
The function of a trademark as an indicator of quality, with the
inherent rights and obligations to control quality, is being constantly tested. The law is developing and the function is being em7
braced as the courts deal with control of quality issues in franchise,
greymarket,8 and trademark dilution cases. 9 Additionally, legal
scholars are acknowledging the legal and social importance of recognizing the quality function of trademarks. 10 Market forces are
capitalizing on the consumer's perception of the quality function of
trademarks, which is especially apparent in the phenomenon of
merchandising."
In merchandising, a strong and famous mark becomes an indicator of quality to consumers. The mark's goodwill sells the product, 1 2 consumers make purchases relying on their past experience
with a product bearing that mark.13 The theory of dilution was proposed by Mr. Schechter to protect the relationship between a strong
and famous mark and the consumer's perception of the quality of
5. Id. at 831, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 345.
6. See infra notes 86-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of trademarks as an assurance of quality and notes 203-367 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the anti-dilution statutes and resulting case-law.
7. See Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care - USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (7th Cir. 1989); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 193 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 649 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) [hereinafter KMart Corp. I]; El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (2d Cir. 1986); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. ABC Int'l Traders Corp., 703 F. Supp. 1398 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Dial Corp. v. Manghnani, Inv.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987).
9. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 1380,
224 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 921 (E.D. N.Y. 1984), rev'd and remanded, 806 F.2d 392, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (2d Cir. 1986).
10. See Hanak, The Quality Assurance Functionof Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 318 (1975), for an analysis of the means used by the courts and administrative agencies to preserve the quality assurance function of trademarks.
11. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relationship between trademarks as indicators of quality and merchandising.
12. In this paper the term "product" is synonymous with "goods," and includes by reference "services."
13. Federal Trade Comm. v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) (Stewart, J.
dissenting). See also Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 815-819, 60
TRADEMARK REP. at 336-338.
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any product bearing that mark.14
So, although control of quality and dilution were presented to
the legal community as a married couple, the legal community has
refused to recognize them as such, instead insisting on treating
them as single and independent of each other. Have they then become for all intents and purposes "Estranged Bedfellows"?
This article will examine the two component parts of Mr.
Schechter's theory - their development and their current status in
the law. It is the purpose of this article to provide evidence to the
legal community that there is indeed a married couple waiting to be
recognized, and together they are "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection."
II.
A.

A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Early View - Trademarks Function Only
to Denote Source

Trademarks did not receive early federal protection, but instead they developed during the nineteenth century as an offshoot
of the common law tort of fraud and deceit. 15 At the turn of the
century, prevailing law held that a trademark's sole purpose was to
16
identify for consumers the product's physical source or origin.
The "orthodox definition" of a trademark's primary and proper
function was given by the Supreme Court in 1916.17 The Court
14. Schechter,.RationalBasis, supra note 2, at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
342.
15. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 981 (1989).
In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court stated that:
The law-of unfair competition has its roots in the common law of deceit; its
general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.
While that concern may result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in
communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not
the protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.
Id. (emphasis original). For further analysis of the history of trademarks see
generally SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1; Diamond, The
Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975), reprintedin, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222 (1983); Pattishall, The ConstitutionalFoundations of American Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 456 (1988) (exploring the early
origins and development of trademark law and the impact of the commerce
clause and other constitutional provisions). See also 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (2d Ed. 1984).
16. K-Mart Corp. II, 108 S. Ct. at 1828 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See, eg., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co.,
113 F. 458, 478 (8th Cir. 1901).
17. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 813-14, 60 TRADEMARK REP.
at 334 ) (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)). It
was the language of "original or ownership" which formed the requirement
that the mark must be of personal ownership. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra
note 2, at 814, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 334 (citing, Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall,
311, 324 (U.S. 1871)); Bablin v. Cusenier, 221 U.S. 580, 591 (1911)). Coupled with
that definition was the rationale that the lawsuit stemmed from an extension of
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stated that a trademark's function was "[t]o identify the origin or
ownership of the goods to which it is affixed."' 8
The value of the trademark was derived from its ability to identify the source of the goods. 19 This view is still widely held by many
courts, scholars, and practitioners, with some emphatically stating
that "[i]t is the source-denoting function which trademark laws protect, and nothing more. '20 And yet, as a consequence of this view,
trademark licensing at the turn of the century was viewed as philosophically impossible because "licensing meant that the mark was
being used by persons not associated with the real manufacturing
'source' in a strict, physical sense of the word."' The harsh result
of this view is the relinquishment of ownership, by theory of abandonment of the trademark, for any attempt by a trademark owner
22
to license a third party.
B. Business Realities Demand Change
As Mr. Schechter so aptly put it, judicial expressions of impatience with these early restrictions in trademark protection "reflect[ed] a consciousness of the need for breadth and liberality ' in
'23
coping with the progressive ingenuity of commercial depravity.
24
Prior to the publication of the article, there was a decade of cases
illustrating this impatience: in 1916, the "universality theory '25 appeared and was quickly followed by the "territoriality theory" of
trademark protection in 1923;26 in 1916 and 1918, there were two
the doctrine of unfair competition beyond the actual "diversion of custom."
Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 821, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 339.
18. Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 412.
19. See Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 680, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1019 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., concurring) (explaining the history of the source theory of trademarks).
20. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301, 204
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1979), remanded, 515 F. Supp. 448, 212
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 748 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316, 215 U.S.P.Q.(BNA)
588 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 565, 566-69, 159
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 388, 391-392 (9th Cir. 1968)).
21. K-Mart Corp.II, 108 S. Ct. at 1828 (citing 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15,
at § 18:13).
22. K-Mart Corp. II, 108 S. Ct. at 1828 (citing Evertt 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk
Teachers' Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1924)).
23. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 813, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at

334.
24. See also SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, for a thorough analysis of the development of trademark law prior to 1925 especially at

146-171 for Mr. Schechter's analysis of "The Problems of the Modern Law Historically Considered."
25. Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) (holding
trademarks merely protected the public from deception by indicating the origin
of the goods they mark, and did not confer on the owner a property interest).
26. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, (1923) (adopting the "territoriality theory" of trademark protection).
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challenges to the territorial limitations on trademarks; 27 in 1920,
the Court recognized that a famous trademark was associated more
closely in the public mind with the product's quality than its origin;2" in 1924, the Court recognized that ownership of a mark does
not prevent a purchaser from repackaging the product and using
the trademark on the label; 29 and 1923 saw the notion of "a single,
30
though anonymous source" creeping into the law.
Schechter foresaw in these developing legal theories logical
conflicts and the need for change in order "to keep abreast of and to
serve the needs of modern business."' 31 From the outset, he admonished his readers that "[t]here is no part of the law which is more
plastic than unfair competition, and what was not reckoned an ac' 32
tionable wrong 25 years ago may have become such today.
III.

REDEFINING A TRADEMARK'S FUNCTION - THE SINGLE,
ALBEIT ANONYMOUS SOURCE

In the first prong of Schechter's attack on early theory, he
asked the question: "To what extent does the trademark of today
really function as either [an indicator of the origin or ownership of
the goods to which it was affixed]?" 33 With a resounding "not in
the least!" he postulated that as law and commerce developed, the
trademark was receding as a source of information with respect to
ownership and was growing in its representation to the public of a
certain level of product quality arising from one source.34 The law
began to reflect a moderation of the strict "source theory" as the
courts began integrating the concept that a trademark functions as
an indicator of "a single, albeit anonymous source. '3 5 By accepting
this concept, the courts recognized that the source or origin is not
27. Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 412; United Drug Co. v. Theodore

Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 100-01 (1918).
28. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
29. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).

30. Coty, Inc. v. LeBlume Import Co., 292 F. 264, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1923),
aff'd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923) ("It is, of course, not necessary that he should be
known as the maker; on the contrary, it will suffice if the article be known as
coming from a single, though anonymous, source.") (Learned Hand, J.).
31. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 813, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
334.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 814, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 335.
34. Id. See also Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 680-81, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J. in his concurring opinion
discusses trademarks signifying a level of quality); 1 J. GI.SON, TRADEMARK
PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.031] (1989).
35. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:3(B).
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36
always known to a consumer.

The modern view is that a trademark indicates "a single, albeit
anonymous source. '3 7 The Lanham Act of 1946 (as amended by the
Clarification Act of 198438) recognizes that, even where consumers
do not know the name of the manufacturer or the producer of a
product, a mark may function as an indicator of source and, therefore, be a valid trademark. 39 It defines a trademark as:
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof - (1)
used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is
40
unknown.
"Anonymity" acknowledges that consumers may not know or
care who the actual source of a product may be, leaving to the consumer the right to assume that all products bearing the same trademark are linked to or sponsored by the same anonymous source. 41
Professor McCarthy 42 noted that the "anonymous source" is a recognition by the courts that "consumer differentiation by means of
trademarks [is] not a precise process, ' 43 but that this recognition of
"anonymity" is not a retraction of a trademark's primary function
as an indicator of source. 44
But if consumers cannot with any precision differentiate between products by means of a trademark, then what means are they
left with? If a trademark does not truly stand for a source, what
does it stand for? What is a trademark?
36. Id. (citing Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & ConstantinLe Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 105 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 160 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955))).
37. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supranote 15, at § 3:3(B); see Thomas Pride Mills, Inc.,

v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 205 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
38. The Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 103(1), 98

Stat. 3335 (as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
39. A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 300, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1354 (3rd Cir. 1986).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. 89) as amended by the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No 100-667, 102 Stat. 3936, 3946 (1988).
41. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:3(B).
42. Professor J. Thomas McCarthy is a member of the faculty at the University of San Francisco School of Law, and is the author of the treatise, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION.

43. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:3 (citing Brown, Advertising and
the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185, 1186 (1948)).
44. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:3 (citing Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette
Co., 389 F.2d 264, 156 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 593 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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IV.

TRADEMARKS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND GOODWILL

A.

Trademarks Are Property Rights

A trademark is a property right,45 with ownership acquired by
actual use 46 of the mark or symbol on goods,47 and property is defined as a bundle of "rights. '48 Dr. Callmann 49 regards trademarks
as a species of property, with the owner having an absolute right to
prevent use by others.5° When analyzing trademark law in economic terms, William Landes and Judge Richard Posner found in
trademarks a property right which empowers the owner with the
ability to exclude others from using the mark. Furthermore, the
trademark owner has total discretion as to whether to enter into an
agreement to license to another the use of the mark.51 They concluded that the property right conferred "two types of economic
' 52
benefit, static and dynamic.
Thus, in a trademark infringement case, the "property right" in
a trademark is the right to prevent confusion.5 3 In a dilution case, 5it4
is the right to maintain the trademark's integrity and uniqueness.
45. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Theaters, Ltd., 604 F.2d

200, 206 (2nd Cir. 1979) (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
413 (1915)).
46. Although under the Trademark Revision Act of 1988, "a person who has
a bona fide intention... to use a trademark in commerce may apply to register
the trademark ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) as amended by the Trademark Revision
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988).
47. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 587 F. Supp. 330, 338 (E.D.
Mo. 1984), affl'd, 750 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1984) ("It is generally said that exclusive
right to use a mark belongs to the first who appropriates it and uses it in connection with a particular business." (citing Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 322
(U.S. 1871)); E & J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657,
1670-71 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (ownership in surname acquired by acquisition of secondary meaning).
48. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950, 957 (1988) [hereinafter KMark Corp. 1] (Trademark law "grants the trademark owner a bundle of ...

rights...").
49. The late Dr. Rudolf Callmann was the author of the treatise, THE LAW
The 4th Edition
(1981) to which I cite was edited by Mr. Louis Altman. [hereinafter CALLMANN].
50. K-Mart Corp. I, 108 S. Ct. at 957, ("Trademark law, like contract law,
confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion"). 3
CALLMANN, supra note 49, at § 17.07.
51. Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES.

REP. 267 (1988).

52. Id.
53. 1 J. MCCARTHY, 'supra note 15, at § 2:6. See Kravitz, Trademarks,
Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U.L. REV. 131 (1989), reprintedin 79
TRADEMARK REP. 604, 608 (1989).
54. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp., 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861, 1864 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Thus, trademark law now pursues two related goals - the prevention of deception and consumer confusion,
and, more fundamentally, the protection of property interest in trademarks.").
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What are grounds for extending the property right beyond its
use to identify a brand? First, the injury is caused by the copier's
appropriation, without compensation, of benefits created by the
trademark owner's substantial investments. 55 These property
57
56
rights are developed through large expenditures of money, time,
and effort. 58 These investments are what builds and perpetuates
the goodwill of the trademark and creates "the synonymous right of
a trademark owner to control his product's reputation." 59 Second,
potential dilution results from a consumer being forced to think
about two or more producers, instead of one, when associating a
trademark with a product, with a resulting blurring of the communicative value of a mark.6° The copier appropriates a portion of the
value engendered in the minds of the public by their experience
with the owner's product, with a resulting financial loss to the
owner.61 The final basis for extending this right is the "investment
in reputation capital" theory, wherein "many persons purchase
branded goods for the purpose of demonstrating to others that they
are consumers of particular goods,"'62 that is, to impress others or
63
advertise themselves.
The Congressional intent in enacting the Lanham Act is expressed in its legislative history.
The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner
of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the
public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappro55. Landes & Posner, supra note 51, at 304.
56. National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 26
Ill. App. 3d 814, 817, 327 N.E.2d 242, 245, 185 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 550, 552 (2nd
Dist.)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). But see Denicola, Trademarks as
Speech, Constitutional Implicationsof the Emerging Rationalesfor the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 159, 165-66 (1982).
57. See Armstrong Cork Co., v. World Carpets, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 613, 615-16
(N.D. Ga. 1977).
58. Arthur Young, Inc., v. Arthur Young & Co., 579 F. Supp. 384, 390 (N.D.
Ala. 1983).
59. James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th

Cir. 1976).
60. Landes & Posner, supra note 51, at 304 (where the authors predict that
the cheap copy will less likely run afoul of anti-dilution statutes than would
appropriation of a well-known trademark for an unrelated product).
61. Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963).
62. Higgins & Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J. L. & ECON. 211 (1986).
63. Landes & Posner, supra note 51, at 305 ("the twist here is that the con-

fusion does not occur in the market for the trademarked good, or in any other
product market, but in a 'resale' market where consumers compete for advantageous personal transactions").
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64
priation by pirates and cheats.

Citing this legislative history, many have argued that the basic policy of the trademark law is the protection of the public from deception,6 5 with the secondary policy being to protect trademark
owners' expenditure of energy, time, and money. 66 This interpretation has been fueled by the notion that "the protection of trademarks originated as a police measure to prevent the grievous deceit
of the people by the sale of deceptive goods, and to safeguard the

collective good will and monopoly of the gild."'67 However, others
would claim this is an excessively narrow reading of the Lanham
Act's legislative history.68

B. Goodwill Is Protected by the Trademark Laws
The Lanham Act was enacted by Congress "to secure trademark owners in the goodwill which they have built up," 69 thus providing national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the
owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and protect the abil70
ity of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.
Trademark laws function to protect the individual reputation and
goodwill which parties build for their goods in the market. 7 1
So what is this goodwill that we are protecting? "Goodwill is
' 72
not a tangible, physical object that can be seen, felt, and tasted.
It exists in the minds of the buying public, where buyers trust the
73
constancy of quality emanating from a particular producer.

64. S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE.
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1274.
65. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 2:1.

66. Eck, Statement of The United States TrademarkAssociation in Support
of S.1883 (DeConcini)the Trademark Revision Act, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 382,
385 & n.2 (1988) (citing HR. Rep. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, February 26,
1945; S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, May 14, 1946).
67. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 819, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
338.
68. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1123
(S.D. N.Y. 1981); Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (1956). See also Schechter, Rational
Basis, supra note 2; Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 582, 602 (1937) for an historical perspective of the evolution of
trademarks.
69. S. Rep. No. 1333, supra note 64, at 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE &
CONG. ADMIN. NEWS at 1276 (cited in Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park, Fly, Inc.,

469 U.S. 189, 213, (1985) (Stevens J., dissenting)).
70. S.Rep. No. 1333, supra note 64, at 3, 5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE &
CONG. ADMIN. SERV. at 1274 (cited in, Park 'N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. at 198).
71. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. N.Y.
1983), supplemented by, 578 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
72. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 2:8(A).
73. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 819, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
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"Goodwill" thus becomes "a business value [that] reflects the basic
human propensity to continue doing business with a seller [whose]
goods and services.., the customer likes and has found adequate to
fulfill his needs. ' 74 It "makes tomorrow's business more than an
7' 5
accident.
"Goodwill" is the advantage obtained from use of a trademark,
which includes the public confidence in the quality of the product,
the warranties made on behalf of the product, and the "name recognition" of the product by the public that differentiates that product
76
from others.
Goodwill is created when the customer has a good memory and
is able to identify the full features of the product with the trademark and when there is no change in the' features of the product
between the first and subsequent consumption decisions.77 Thus,
the trademark has a reputation with the old customer that identi78
fies its features.
Conversely, a trademark is merely the symbol of goodwill for
the business with which it is associated. 79 It enables a producer to
capitalize on such goodwill by providing a sure method of identifying a particular producer's goods to the public. "Once... goodwill is
established, trademarks become an, extremely important medium of
advertisement." 80 Trademarks become potent weapons in the competitive contest, for they guarantee, identify, and sell the article to
which they refer.8 1 They make the complex and impersonal marketplace more tolerable to the consumer allowing him to quickly
identify the products which please him.8 2 A trademark symbolizes
74. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 2:8(A).
75. Id.
76. Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853
n.3 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1987), reh'g denied, 479 U.S. 1062
(1987).

77. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78
528 (1988).

TRADEMARK

REP. 523,

78. Id.
79. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:1.

80. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301, 204
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 301, 204 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 982. See 3 CALLMANN, supra note 49, at
§ 17.01; Economides, supra note 77, at 526.
82. Anti-Monopoly, 611 F.2d at 301, 204 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 982 (citing Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566, 159 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 391) (9th Cir. 1968). See also
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338, 228 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 145, 146 (7th

Cir. 1985) (the purpose of a trademark "is to reduce the cost of information to
consumers by making it easy for them to identify the products of producers

with which they have had either good experiences, so that they want to keep
buying the product (or buying from the producer), or bad experiences, so that

they want to avoid the product or the producer in the future.") (citing Scandia
Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429-30, 227 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 138,
142 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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nothing more than the public's confidence or "goodwill" in a particular product, and the trademark becomes insignificant once it is
83
separated from that confidence.
A trademark owner is entitled to protection from probable
damage to the mark's goodwill where dissatisfied purchasers might
conclude that the owner produced the product bought.8 4 To possess
goodwill in a trademark one does not have to manufacture the prod85
uct to which it is attached.
Just as trademarks are a bundle of rights, goodwill is a bundle
of rights and also of obligations, for goodwill is a direct function of
the integrity of the product.
V.

GOODWILL AND THE CONTROL OF QUALITY

Trademarks encourage competition, promote economic growth and
raise the standard of living for all of our citizens.... America stakes its
reputation on its trademarks. They are the most important ambassadors the United States sends abroad.86
In the 1883 Supreme Court case of ManhattanMedicine Co. v.
Wood,8 7 Justice Field noted that a "trademark is both a sign of the
quality of the article and an assurance to the public that it is the
genuine product of his [the owner's] manufacture. '8 8 Almost forty
years later, Justice Holmes in Coca-Cola Co. V. Koke Co. of
America8 9 commented that the famous trademark COCA-COLA
had perhaps become more associated in the public's mind with the
product (quality) than with the producer (origin). 9°
When Mr. Schechter wrote his article in 1927, he was able to
observe the coming dominance of the quality assurance function of
trademarks and write that "a true function [is], then, to identify a
product as satisfactory."9 1 It was his opinion that trademarks convey a package of information associated with a product, not just the
83. Premier Dental Prods. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 (3d
Cir. 1986).
84. AFP Imaging Corp. v. Photo-Therm Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534,
1539 (D. N.J. 1989).
85. Where the manufacturer subcontracts the production of a product,
which will be sold under the manufacturer's trademark, the goodwill developed
by the consumer's satisfaction with that product inures to the manufacturer trademark owner.
86. 134 CONG. REC. S16,973 (daily ed. October 20, 1988) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini referring to S.1883).
87. 108 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1883).
88. Id., quoted in Hanak, supra note 10, at 318.
89. 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
90. Id. at 146; Hanak, supra note 10, at 319.
91. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 818, 60 TRADEMARK REP at

337 (the second function being to stimulate further purchases by the consuming
public); Hanak, supra note 10, at 319-20.
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identity of the product's source. 92
A. - Quality Is Derived From the Constant Elements
of the Product
Quality comes from the constant, consistent elements in the
product itself.93 It is the experience of dealing with a product over
time that leads people to know that one mark stands for a better
quality than another mark. The value of a trademark is only enhanced after there has been sufficient, substantial use of the trademark on products. The quality has to be there in the first place, but
94
the sense of quality develops in the buyer's mind only after use.
Sales of the product develop the goodwill first, then the consumer's
perception of the quality within the product enhances the goodwill
even further.9 5 To protect the goodwill and resulting value of the
trademark the owner must be constantly vigilant to maintain consistent quality.96
B.

The Development of the Recognition of the Quality Function
of a Trademark

The quality function of trademarks was recognized in the Lanham Act of 1946. 9 7 It continues to be argued, however, that the
quality function does not replace the source function but stands
along side it, with the quality theory being but a facet of the older
source theory. 98 This dual nature argument of trademark function
permits the mark to indicate source or quality, or both, depending
upon the manner of use:
The primary function of a trademark is to indicate a single source of
origin of articles to which it refers and to offer assurance to ultimate
consumers that articles so labeled will conform to quality standards
established99 and, when licensed to others, controlled by the
proprietor.
92. See generally Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 815-19, 60
TRADEMARK REP. at 336-38.

93. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:4.
94. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 51.
95. Examples of where goodwill has developed include: LIFE-SAVERS, RAID,
COcA-CoLA. Conversely, it is argued that where items are selected for purchase
solely because of price considerations the mark is weak.
96. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 2:1.
97. Lanham Act, § 45 definition of "related company," 15 U.S.C. § 1127, § 5,
Lanham Act 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1988); 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:4. See
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358, 121 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 430
(2d Cir. 1959).
98. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:4.
99. Id. at § 3:4 (quoting Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 205 (N.D. Ga. 1967)). See also Drexel Enters., Inc. v. Ameritage
Inc., 138 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 88, 90 (T.T.A.B. 1963) ("The [furniture] purchaser
would have to rely upon his own judgment, or rely upon the reputation of the
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Realistically, in today's marketplace a mark's source-indicating
function is subordinated to that of providing the purchaser with an
assurance of the good's make and quality.1°(
The consumer understands the mark to function as a proclamation of the producer's commitment that all goods bearing the identical mark will be consistent in "nature, quality, and
characteristics."10 1 Yet there is no legally enforceable bargain that
the goods are guaranteed to be a constant level of quality by virtue
of the mark. 10 2 It is the goodwill and value of the trademark that
the producer wants to maintain that compels the guarantee.1 0 3
(i) Trademark Rights Can Be Lost When Quality Is Not
Controlled
Trademark rights can be lost through abandonment, non-use,
or a "naked license"' 0 4 without control over product quality.'0 5 Ad1 °6
ditionally, no deceptive changes may be made to the product.
Where the owner changes the character and quality of his product
and does not deceive the public, his trademark rights remain intact. 107 When the trademark owner perceives a need to change the
features of his product to meet market and consumer demands, he
has a choice of actions: (1) change the product's unobservable characteristics to conform to the new tastes, (2) introduce a new trademarked product which more closely matches the new tastes, leaving
the old product on the market, or (3) simultaneously introduce new
product and withdraw old product.'0 8 Additionally, regional variances in products to reflect various regional tastes are allowed.' 0 9
Thus, some courts have allowed unannounced changes of ingredidealer, or rely upon the reputation of the manufacturer as signified by a trademark. A trademark functions both as an indication of quality and of source.").
100. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 49, at § 17.03; Hanak, supra note 10, at 319.
101. 3 CALLMANN, supra note 49, at § 17.03.
102. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:4.

103. Id.
104. A transfer of a mark absent the

goodwill of the business or product it
represents is an invalid, "naked" transfer of rights. Id.

105. Tally Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.6,
13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1136 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989). See also Cartier, Inc., v.
Three Sheaves Co., 465 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (court held that where

license contains no provision for quality control by licensor, there was no transfer of rights, as license was void as against public policy).
106. See Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922); Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448 (D. N.J. 1910).
107. Hanak, supra note 10, at 330.
108. Economides, supra note 77, at 529-30 ("Coke, using third strategy introduced a new formula COKE; withdrawing old COKE, when it was apparent
that there was demand for old COKE it was introduced as CLASSIC COKE.").
109. See Lever Bros. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(court acknowledges that manufacturers adjust products to reflect countries
differing tastes and conditions).
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ents as long as the general quality level remains unimpaired.110
Conversely, other courts have denied trademark owners equitable relief where the nature or ingredients of the underlying product are secretly"' and materially changed. 112 Trademark owners
have also been denied relief when "they have debased the quality of
the goods sold under the mark. 11 3 One district court sustained the
use of the doctrine of unclean hands to promote the quality function of a mark, stating that "[tihere is no doubt that a trademark
owner who deceives the public by debasing the quality of the product for which his trademark stands may be barred by unclean hands
from maintaining an action for infringement. 11 4 In fact, where a
producer believes that the market for his product is failing he may
elect to exploit its reputation by selling lower quality goods with
the realization that in doing so he may destroy the mark's
115
goodwill.
(ii) Control of Quality Allows for Licensing
When Mr. Schechter proposed his theory, the licensing of
trademarks was prohibited and courts invalidated agreements licensing the use of a trademark without an accompanying transfer
110. Menendez v. Farber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 174
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds sub noma. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
granted sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 416 U.S.
981 (1974) (no loss of trademark protection where cigars no longer contained
Cuban tobacco provided quality remained high); Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc., v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947, 133 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687 (C.C.P.A. 1962). See also Rick v.
Buchansky, 609 F. Supp. 1522, 226 U.S.P.Q. 449 (BNA) (S.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 770 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1985) (court held that where a musical group's
members kept changing, the group's manager, who kept the group going, owned
the trademark).
111. Mr. Hanak suggests that the term "secretly" does not "imply any affirmative action was necessarily taken to prevent public disclosure, but simply
meant that little or no affirmative action was taken to assure public disclosure."
Hanak, supra note 10, at 321.
112. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 3:4. See also Royal Baking Powder
Co., v. FTC, 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922) (court held that plaintiff's change from
cream of tarter to a phosphate baking powder coupled with the use of an almost
identical mark was unfair competition).
113. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 34, at § 8.12[13] [c] [v] (citing, Renand Sales Co.
v. Davis, 22 F. Supp. 703, 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 125 (D. Mass. 1938), modified by,
104 F.2d 683, 42 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 42 (1st Cir. 1939)). It is argued that the trademark is a property right with which the trademark owner can do anything he
pleases, including taking down the quality level and running out the mark. The
argument is that this is a business decision and nothing more. This author has
to query - what happened to the trademark's purpose of protecting consumers
from deception?
114. Menendez, 345 F. Supp. 527, 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80. See also Hanak,
supra note 10, at 322.
115. Economides, supra note 77, at 529.
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of the related business interest." 6
It is well settled that trademark rights are merely symbols of
goodwill." 7 Because of this historical starting point, a mark may
only be transferred or assigned as a distinct asset representing goodwill as it exists solely in connection with a business or a product."18
These tenets encompass the understanding that trademarks signify
the source and the quality of the products. 119 A transfer of a mark
absent the goodwill of the business or product it represents is an
invalid, "naked" transfer of rights.120
In the 1930s, a new interpretation was developed approving of
trademark licensing where the licensor controlled the quality of the
licensee's products.'
It was premised on the theory that a trademark could also function as an identifier of product quality for consumers. 122 And thus a trademark license came to mean an
agreement whereby a licensee was authorized to produce a product
in accordance with a licensor's standards. 123 The law was evolving
to recognize an additional function - one where the mark assures
the purchaser of a certain degree of uniformity or quality in the
124
products to which it is attached.
The trend to allow licensing became the rule with the passage
of the Lanham Act in 1946.125 This trend in the law prompted the
116. Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 458, 468

(8th Cir. 1901). For a discussion of the Macmahan PharmacalCo. case as the
precedent of the source theory of trademarks prior to the Lanham Act, see
Marks, Trademark Licensing - Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 642 (1988).
117. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2:7.

118. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Dresser
Indus. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 464 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934 (1968); Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply
Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 1986). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1060 which states: "A
registered mark ... shall be assignable with the goodwill of that business in
which the mark is used, or with that part of the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark ....
119. S. Rep. No. 1333, supra note 64, at 3, 5.
120. Berni v. International Gourmet Restaurants of America, 838 F.2d 642
(2d Cir. 1988); J. Atkins Holdings Ltd. v. English Discounts, Inc., 729 F. Supp.
945, 950 (S.D. N.Y. 1990).
121. K-Mark Corp. II, 108 S. Ct. at 1829 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
Grismore, The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 30 MICH. L. REV.
490, 491 (1932) ("[T]here is much confusion in the books in regard to the transferability of trade marks and trade names.").
122. Id. K-Mart Corp. II, 108 S. Ct. at 1829 (citing 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra,
note 15, at § 18:13).
123. Mr. Marks suggests that this occurred at a time when the licensor and
the licensee were equally knowledgeable about the particular industry and the
nature and quality of the goods to be produced and also at a time when the
licensor could set the standards. Marks, supra note 116, at 646.
124. Hanak, supra note 10, at 318.
125. Lanham Act, ch. 22, in particular, § 5 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1055) and
the definition of "related company" in § 45 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127); K-Mart
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Lanham Act definition of "related company, 1 26 which noted
therein that there is a need to control "the nature and quality of the
goods.., with which the mark is used. '127 The rule was broadened
in 1962 when Congress amended section 32(1)(a) of the Act to delete the italicized portion of the following provision:
[The infringement must be] likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive[.]
purchasersas to the source of origin of such goods
28
or services.1

The concept of a trademark as solely a symbol of product source is
slowly being eroded. 129 Franchising and merchandising have made
trademark licensing a widespread commercial practice with a resulting development of a new rationale for trademarks as representative of product quality.13°
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.131 was the "bellwether" of 'guaranty' trademark licensing under the Lanham
Act. 1 32 From that point forward a trademark owner could avoid a
133
finding of abandonment by utilizing controlled licensing.
Thus the Lanham Act provides protection for a mark where
the trademark owner has the right to control the quality of the
goods when a third party manufacturers the goods sold under the
mark.134 Conversely, goods sold by a licensed manufacturer but
which are not available for quality control inspections by the tradeCorp. II, 108 S. Ct. at 1829. See also Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 366-67, 121
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 436-437, for a historical perspective on this change in the law.
126. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, defines "related companies" as: "any
person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect
to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which
the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102
Stat. 3946 (1988)).
127. Id.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-772 § 17, 76 Stat. 773,
Oct. 9, 1962). 1 J. GILSON, supra note 34, at § 1.03[1]. But see The United States
Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP.
375, 378 (1987) (hereinafter USTA Commission Paper) ("The bill deleted "purchasers" to make it clear that the provision related to potential as well as to
actual purchasers.").
129. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 514
F.2d 665, 670-71 (5th cir. 1975); El Greco Leather Prods. v. Shoe World, Inn., 806
F.2d 392, 395, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1936); Siegal v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 269, 273 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Cf. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
130. Siegel, 448 F.2d at 48, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 273; Note, Quality Control
and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
131. 267 F.2d 358, 121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Turner v.
HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 330 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1006.
132. Marks, supra note 116, at 643.
133. Id.
134. Lanham Act, supra note 64.
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mark owner are not "genuine" goods, regardless of their actual
quality.13 5 This is the result of the trademark owner's inability to
inspect the goods and certify their quality.1i 6 "[T]he actual quality
of quality that a tradeof the goods is irrelevant: it is the control
'13 7
mark holder is entitled to maintain.
The quality control rationale grew out of the commercial desire
to license trademarks, coupled with the court's reluctance to uphold
the license absent a showing of the trademark owner's involvement
by exercising quality control.138 Thus, quality control preserves the
fiction of single origin.' 3 9 Acknowledging the proposition that the
trademark does not have to identify the origin, it is sufficient that
the public knows or assumes that all products bearing the mark
come from a single source. 140
The typical proof of control of quality, to meet Lanham Act
standards, is the inclusion of a provision that specifically states that
the mark's owner will maintain control of quality over the licensee's goods or services. The right to control quality is exhibited in
the license agreement in various ways, among them: criteria for
trademark registration notices, with rules about placement, size
and proportion of the trademark to be affixed; the trademark
owner furnishing detailed specifications and standards for the goods
to be produced; submission of plans, drawings, preliminary models,
and actual samples to the owner; prior approval of advertising; provisions for inspection of the licensee's facilities, including unannounced spot inspections; assertions of continued controls over the
nature and quality of the licensed goods; and remedies for failure to
141
meet standards.
When one or more of these conditions fails to be met, where a
dispute erupts between the parties, or where a trademark infringement action is commenced, the licensing practices will come under
critical judicial scrutiny. 142 The strongest penalty for failure to
comply with the terms of the agreement or to adequately police the
licensee's activities is a finding that there was a "naked" or uncon135. E7 Greco, 806 F.2d at 395, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 1 J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 15, at § 3:4 (1989 Supp. at 25).
136. El Greco, 806 F.2d at 395, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017-18.
137. Id. at 395, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017 (citing Professional Golfer's Ass'n
of Am. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1976)).
138. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 18:13(B).
139. Id.
* 140. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 817, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
336.
141. Marks, supra note 116, at 642-43; Comment, Trademark Licensing: The
Problem of Adequate Control, 1968 DUKE L.J. 875, 882 (1968), reprintedin, 59
TRADEMARK REP. 820, 826 (1969).

142. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 18:15. See Marks, supra note 116, at
641.
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trolled license.' 43 A naked or uncontrolled license effectively
works an abandonment of the licensed trademark. 44
Unfortunately, judicial examination of the extent of control exercised is unusual.' 45 In a number of cases, the lip service inclusion
of contractual provisions in the agreement or slight control exercised by the licensor has been held sufficient.1 46 These results do
is
not adequately answer the concern that a lack of effective control
48
47
and to the trademark's value.'
a detriment to the consumer
Interestingly, trademark owners with strong and famous trademarks take a hard line when licensing their marks to maintain con143. Midwest Fur Prods. Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n, 127 F.
Supp. 217, 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)) 389 (W.D. Wis. 1955); 1 J. MCCARTHY, sUpra
note 15, at § 18:15.
144. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Autoteller Sys. Serv. Corp., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1749 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (Board held that a quality control requirement that
the mark only be used in connection with goods and services "of the same quality as those on which it was already using the mark" was a "naked license at
best"); Heaton Enter. of Nev., Inc. v. Lang, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 (T.T.A.B.
1988) (the court found that the petitioner had attempted to maintain licenses in
transactions he had labeled sales and had no right of quality control).
145. Marks, supra note 116, at 641; Comment, supra note 141, at 898, 59
TRADEMARK REP. at 840 ("While the range of the control spectrum can be delineated, it remains difficult to predict whether courts will find a particular licensing contract within that range."); Borchard & Osman, Trademark Sublicensing
and Quality Control, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99 (1980).
146. Penta Hotels Ltd. v. Penta Tours, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (D. Conn.
1988) (court held although there was no written agreement providing for quality control, no written evidence of inspections and no evidence that licensee
adhered to quality control measures which licensor could rely on, defendant
failed to meet its high burden of proof); Bureau Nat'l Interprofessional Du Cognac v. International Better Drinks Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610 (T.T.A.B.
1988) (Board held that where there was never an opportunity to test whether
there was control, abandonment could not be found by virtue of a lack of written quality control provisions); Nestle Co. v. Nash-Finch Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1085 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (Board found sufficient control absent written
licenses where the licensor was controlling the nature and goods by training the
personnel, controlling the purchase of raw materials and conducting periodic
inspections); Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 648 F. Supp.
187 (E.D. N.Y. 1986) (quality control requirement, absent contractual rights to
control or inspect, satisfied where licensor had confidence in licensee's president's integrity).
Mr. Marks advocates "it is reasonable to conclude that the right to challenge improper licensing has become largely illusory - a conclusion supported
by the paucity of cases invalidating trademark rights on the basis of inadequate
" Marks, supra note 116, at 657-58. He thus concluded
control by a licensor ..
from his examinations of the quality control and policing function of trademark
licensing that it would better serve the public interest to relax the quality control standards in merchandising and advocated that a public body study this
issue. Id.
147. Marks, supra note 116, at 642.
148. In addition to a finding that the mark has been abandoned, the trademark's value can be diminished by the court finding "a break in the chain of
continuous use necessary to prove priority of use over another; a finding that a
license is void; or that the licensor is estopped from challenging the licensee's
uncontrolled use." 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 18:15 (citations omitted).
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trol of quality. 1 4 9 They establish codified licensing and franchising
specifications for their licensees and their inspectors; 5 0 train soand to prephisticated personnel to recognize trademark problems
152
vent them;15 ' and establish standards of service.
The owners of valuable marks establish criteria by which they
measure the level of the quality to be met by their licensed
products.
[The] quality of the goods must equal or exceed a stated standard; depending on circumstances, this may be the quality of the same article
as produced by the licensor or by other licensees, the quality of the
licensee's current production of some similar article, or the quality of
produced by named or otherwise designated
similar articles
15 3
competitors.

The exercise of quality control is important to protect the validity of the trademark from a defense of abandonment of the mark
which stems from allegations of uncontrolled licensing.lM Arguably, when a trademark owner does not exercise quality control, it is
tantamount to allowing a stranger to use the mark. Consequently,
uncontrolled licensing of a mark by the owner results in abandonment because the use by other parties of the mark, absent inspection and supervision to assure the maintenance of the quality which
the name has come to represent, results in the name losing its sig55
nificance as a mark.
It has been argued that trademark licensing rules with respect
to quality control have not kept up with business practice.'- But
without the maintenance of this standard, how are consumers to be
149. Issues of product liability arise due to the elements of control. A major
question is whether the trademark licensor, as an apparent manufacturer, could
be strictly liable where there is a product failure. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs, §§ 400-402A. But see Accuride Int'l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d
1531, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989) ("mere possibility of product liability claims insufficient to justify relief").
150. Marks, supra note 116, at 648.
151. Id.
152. An example of "standards of service" is McDonald's business philosophy "Q.S.C.V." or "quality, service, cleanliness, and value." Quality Inns Int'l,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D. Md. 1988).
153. Diamond, Requirements of a Trademark Licensing Program,1962 Bus.
LAW. 295.
154. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 18:15.
155. Heaton Enterprises of Nev., Inc. v. Lang, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842, 1847
(T.T.A.B. 1988) (court held that plaintiff sought to license use of name while
retaining ownership. However, contracts did not contain provisions for quality
control of the services to be performed nor was there evidence that quality control could be exercised); see Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 198
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Yocum v. Covington, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
210 (T.T.A.B. 1982); Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders
Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 217, 103 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 389 (W.D. Wis. 1955).
156. Marks, supra note 116, at 642.
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protected? If they are not protected, how are trademarks going to
continue to reflect goodwill and corresponding value?
Today it is argued that trademark licensing increases the availability of quality products. 157 The courts sustain licensing contracts
where the amount of control retained by the trademark owner over
the nature and quality of the licensee's product is felt to be ade158
quate to protect consumer reliance on the trademark.
(iii) Control of Quality and the "Guaranty" Theory
It was with the development and acceptance of the control rationale that the "guaranty" theory of trademarks came firmly into
the law. 159 According to this theory, the trademark owner guarantees that his mark would appear only on goods of a certain quality
which could be relied on by the consumer as indicating a consistent
product level. 16°
Quality control requirements also exist to assure that the consumer will not be conned, bilked, or hurt. Dr. Callmann's treatise
notes that a trademark assures the public that goods bearing the
161
same mark are similar in "nature, quality, or characteristics.'
For these reasons the courts require that licensing contracts set
forth criteria which establish the quality of the product. 162
Additionally, courts have recognized the rights and obligations
of franchisors to control the quality of the goods bearing their
mark. They have acknowledged that, to the consumer, a trademark
157. Proponents of the phenomenon of franchising often herald it as a
method by which trademark licensing increases the availability of quality products. The development and acceptance of the "quality" function of trademarks
has contributed to this phenomenon, coupled with this is the rapid adoption of

the franchise system, wherein individuals develop retail operations promoting
the franchised mark. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 18:22.
158. Comment, supra note 141, at 882, 59 TRADEMARK REP. at 826.
159. See generally Dawn Donut Co. v. Harts' Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358,
121 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (2d cir. 1959).
160. In the absence of trademarks, it could be argued that quality regulation, say through minimum quality standards, enforced through laws on
fraud, could conceivably create similar levels of efficiency in the marketplace. Although quality minimums might be upheld through regulation, it
is practically impossible to regulate variety efficiently. Given the consen-

sus among consumers on the desirability of a quality feature, a regulatory
board can set minimum quality standards.
Economides, supra note 77, at 530.
Where there are different standards of quality under the same trademark
by the first owner - they are eating away at the goodwill, and that only diminishes the value of the trademark, it does not endanger the validity, as trademark rights are the owners rights as long as the trademark is in use.
161. 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 49, at § 17.03. Hanak, supra note 10, at 318.
162. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 649 (5th Cir. 1977); Haymarket Sports, Inc. v. Turian,
581 F.2d 257, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 610 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 1 J. McCARTHY, supra
note 15, at § 18:14(A).
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identifies a product and implies consistency. 163 It also creates a correlative duty in the owner to assure consistent quality. 164 Where
the franchisor/trademark owner has broken off business relationships with the franchisee/licensee, his right to prevent continued
used of his mark has been upheld.16 5 The courts have found that
any continued use would violate the trademark owner's duty to control the quality of the goods. 16
The landmark greymarket 167 case, A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,1 8 which was decided prior to publication of Mr. Schechter's
seminal article, provided him with an insight as to the problems
which were arising in our trademark system. 69 Greymarket cases
have been tied to the strength of the United States dollar; they
seem to appear when the dollar is strong and imported products
170
become relatively less expensive.
6

Thus, in the 1970s and early 1980s when the dollar was strong
there were a flurry of greymarket cases.171 These cases illustrate
trademark owners' concerns over the damage done to their goodwill
by the loss of control over quality. 172 The United States trademark
owners often made claims that the infringing imports were not
backed by a warranty; 173 were inferior in quality as a result of im163. Gorenstein Entrs., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762,1764 (7th Cir. 1939) (citing Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp.,
596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979)).
164. Id.
165. Id. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392,
396, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1986); Burger-King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 693, 700-01 (11th Cir. 1983).
166. Gorenstein Enters., 874 F.2d at 435, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764. El
Greco, 806 F.2d at 396, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018-19; Burger-King,710 F.2d at
1492; Franchised Stores of New York, Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir.
1968).
167. "Greymarket goods," which are also known as "parallel imports," are
foreign manufactured goods, which bear a registered U.S. trademark, that are
legally purchased abroad and are imported into the United States without the
consent of the American trademark owner. See K-Mark Corp. II, 108 S. Ct. at
1812.
168. 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
169. Mr. Schechter cites to the Katzel case in note 13 of RationalBasis. Additionally, he expresses concern over the impact of the development of "the
chain type of organization" on trademark law. Schechter, RationalBasis, supra
note 2, at 824, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 341.
170. Supra note at 167.
171. K-Mark Corp. H 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) was the major case of the era. In
it the Supreme Court examined the Customs Service regulation for determining whether the overseas manufacturer was the "same person" as the U.S.
trademark owner or a person "subject to common...control" with the U.S.
trademark owner. K-Mart Corp. II, 108 S.Ct. at 1819.
172. Id.. 108 S.Ct. at 1828-31 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
173. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. ABC Int'l Traders Corp., 703 F. Supp. 1398
(C.D. Cal. 1988).
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proper shipping and storage;174 were products not intended for the
United States market;175 and were being sold in a market which the
trademark owner did not intend to sell the product. 176 The basic
premise behind these: arguments is that the United States trademark owner owns the mark's American goodwill, 177 with its inherent representations of quality, and the importer is placing products
bearing the mark into the United States market without compliance with the quality standards of the United States trademark
owner. 178 The damage to the trademark owner is threefold: the
owner must support the greymarket product, by such means as warranty repairs, to assure the maintenance of his product's quality image; the owner's own sales are eroded by competition with the
cheaper greymarket products; and the owner's ability to control the
development of the product's market and image are thwarted by
the uncontrolled influx of the greymarket products.

VI.

THE FUNCTION OF TRADEMARKS IN THE MARKETPLACE

A.

Trademarks Advertise the Product

The trademark is a symbol which is simple and quickly
grasped. 179 Its use speeds up thinking, communicating, and
80
buying.'
In modern marketing the predominant function of a trademark
is to indicate degree of quality, and, subordinately, to indicate origin
174. Duracell Inc. v. Global Imports, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651 (S.D.

N.Y. 1989) (court noted that batteries have a limited shelf life, and that the life
of name-brand batteries is an important quality to consumers). See also In re
Certain Alkaline Batteries, U.S.I.T.C. Invest. No. 337-TA-165, Nov. 1984.
175. Lever Bros. v. United States, 877 F.2d at 10b 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1987) (the "adoption papers" enclosed with the infringing CABBAGE PATCH
dolls were in Spanish); (Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv. Corp. 659 F. Supp. 1230
(D. Conn. 1987); Dial Corporation v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (infringing DIAL soap had a different chemical composition, different fragrance, lacked' active ingredient which made it a deodorant soap, and was not
properly labeled under FDA requirements).
176. See supra notes 173-175 and the cases cited therein.
177. "A fortiori, a genuine good marked with a genuine mark will have different legal consequences, depending on the country. And there may be a different entity in each country with the right to control those goods with that
mark." Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d at 659, 681, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) at 1001, 1020 (3d cir. 1989) (Becker, J., concurring).
178. Id.
179. Economides, supra note 77, at 523.
180. By way of example, "in the prestige fragrance field trademarks are extremely important - because no matter how much money you spend on advertising and models, the marketing person can't get the total concept across unless
they use the right trademark, which symbolizes everything, which is what
trademarks are all about." From a conversation with Mr. Patrick E. Boland,
Trademark Counsel at S.C. Johnson.
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or source.18 1 "Consumers rarely know or care about the origin of a
product. 1 8 2 Therefore, trademark owners have a stake in continuing to ensure the quality of the products with which their mark has
become identified.18 3 The level of quality - high or low or mediocre
- is not the issue; it is the consistency or constancy of that quality
which becomes important to the consumer.184 It is out of this "consistency" level that the phenomenon of franchising has grown.' 8 5
Equal quality levels, cleanliness, consistently fast service, and value
at every location's are the cornerstones of the franchising industry.
The impetus for the modern development of the law of trademarks comes from the demands of modern advertising. The creative forces in the advertising world conjure up an image, create a
corresponding mark - and arrive at a market for the product.
Accordingly, in examining the economic justification for advertising, one author established a simple test: "Is it designed to make
the final consumer a more competent buyer?"' 8 7 Advertising promotes a mental image which includes an ability to distinguish between a trademarked product's quality and variety features, and
88
therefore permits competition in yet another dimension.'
The consumer wants to be able to relate trademarks to their
own personal measure of quality; simply, to what he/she likes and
dislikes.' 8 9 Thus, "[i]f the origin of a product is of concern to a consumer, it is only because the manufacturer's products have come to
be associated with a certain level of quality."'19
The consumer divides the features of the product between
quality features and variety features. 191 Trademarks enable con181. Hanak, supra note 10, at 319.
182. Id.
183. 1 J. McCARTHY,supra note 15, at § 18:13(B).
184. Id.
185. Gorenstein Entrs., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d at 431, 435, 10
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1762, 1764 (7th Cir. 1989).
186. Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 203 (D.
Md. 1938).
187. CHARINGTON, THE CONSUMER LOOKS AT ADVERTISING 186 (1928).
188. Economides, supra note 77, at 532.
189. [A] trademark today does not evoke in the minds of consumers separate and independent concepts of product and source, but rather evokes a
'brand image.' A brand image is a complex constellation of association and
images that comprises a consumer's knowledge of the brand and his attributes towards it. It may include knowledge of the source of the product,
awareness of other product characteristics, beliefs about the value of the
object, and judgments about the suitability of the brand.
Note, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Ffect-on-Competition Test, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 868, 869 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
190. Hanak, supra note 10, at 319.
191. It is more desirable to have a greater amount of quality features, as long
as there is a willingness to pay for the increase in quality. Economides, supra
note 77, at 525.
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sumers to choose between products with unobservable differences
in quality or variety to obtain the desired combination of features. 192 This encourages firms to maintain consistent standards
and to compete for consumers. 193 The repeat consumer is a direct
result of the reaction to the first sample of the product - if it is a
good experience.

B. Merchandised Trademarks Create New Markets
The creation of a market through an established symbol implies that
people float on a psychological current engendered by194the various advertising devices which give a trademark its potency.
Merchandising creates a market for an item.195 In merchandising, the owner of a well-known trademark licenses a trademark to
someone else for application to goods of a different kind, probably a
different trade. 196 The practice utilizes a mark's commercial magnetism, building and retaining the market. It is important to note
just how very expensive it is for companies to develop trademarks.
192. Id. at 526.
193. Id. at 525. Interestingly enough, several commentators hold the view
that trademark rights form barriers to entry, reasoning "trademarks may be a
mixed blessing, however. One school of thought, building on the ideas of economist Edward Chamberlain, has warned that trademarks may impede competition by creating irrational brand loyalties that pose a barrier to entry." Kravitz,
supra note 53, at 608 n.17 (citing Naresh, Incontestabilityand Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 958 (1986)).
194. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
208 (1942). Justice Frankfurter further observed:
The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true
that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led
to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity
by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with
the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed,
the aim is the same - to convey through the market, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.
Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
195. Merchandising of trademarks is somewhat a phenomenon of the 1980s,
where there has been a proliferation of merchandising symbols, such as the
names or insignia of professional sports teams or musical groups. The emblazed
items cost considerably more than unadorned items and yet they sell. See Denicola, InstitutionalPublicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandisingof Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C.L. REV. 603 (1984), reprinted in 75 TRADEMARK
REP. 41 (1985); Gaines & Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 431 (1979).
196. Marks, supra note 116, at 646-47 (currently, different forms of licensing
are being developed - what has come to be known as "merchandising", "collateral product licensing" or "character licensing").
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Merchandising stacks the deck in the marketing persons' favor.' 97
The marketing person goes out and, instead of spending a lot of
money establishing a brand, 9 8 pays a royalty for an established
brand in a non-related field. Well-known marks have an incalculable value and can bring an immense premium at a corporate
acquisition. 199
Today it is standard practice to apply trademarks of goods normally applied in one product area to goods in another product
area. 2° ° One of the major reasons for this change is that the companies that own well-known trademarks are presented with an opportunity to generate royalty income with minimal effort. Other
companies enter into merchandising arrangements which enable
them to enter a new business end-market without having to make
major investments in a product's development and advertising and
which allows them to share the financial risks with a partner. Merchandisers hope that the established trademark's fame and goodwill
will carry over to the new area and for that they are willing to pay a
royalty. 20 Unfortunately, where the licensor does not know the industry of the licensee, or feels that the merchandising is inconsequential, not enough attention may be given to the aspect of quality
control.
"Merchandising will continue to expand in ways not even
thought of."'202 But care must be taken as merchandising may endanger the value of a trademark, when there is market saturation.
197. See generally Gaines & Battersby, supra note 195, at 434-37; Marks,
supra note 116, at 646-47.

198. What does it cost to develop a trademark? Mr. Patrick E. Boland of S.C.

Johnson stated that just to bring out a minor product, e.g., a man's fragrance,
"Carrington," the first year investment would be $5 million. When Calvin
Klein came out with "Obsession" perfume they poured $18 million into advertising - to establish the brand overnight as a prestige brand that people wanted
to buy.
199. Anson, Realistic, Market Based Trademark and Brand Valuations, LICENSING J., May, 1989, at 14. One licensing expert wrote that:
If the top U.S. advertisers and consumer goods companies would value their
trademarks and brand names, in a real world market based environment,
they could probably add $25 billion to their balance sheet value. Accurate,
market based brand name and trademark values represent a vast pool of
untapped assets. For example, Grand Met added over 500 million pounds
sterling to their asset based when they valued the Smirnoff brand in the
Heublien acquisition.

Id. For a discussion and criticism of the accounting practices being used in
brand valuations, see Contra On the Brandwagon, The Economist, January 20,

1990, at 17.
200. American consumers are educated through advertising and merchandising techniques to accept leaps among the product lines. An example of one
licensing situation: Campbell's Soup and Campbell's Kitchen utensils.

201. Examples of families of marks which have been merchandised are the
trademarks of Walt Disney, Coca-Cola, and Fisher Price.
202. Marks, supra note 116, at 647.
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Therefore, a careful hand must be played at all times. For without
a careful monitoring of the licensees, merchandising may be harmful to the trademark's long term value.
VII.

ANTIDILUTION LAWS PROTECT A TRADEMARK'S GOODWILL

The selling power of trademarks is being undermined in the
marketplace. The selling power is the association in the public
mind with the excellence of the product. 20 3 Mr. Schechter's article
is concerned with "[t]rademark pirates" who "proceed circumspectly, by suggestion and approximation, rather than by direct and
exact duplication of their victims' wares and marks. '2° 4 Antidilution statutes focus on the investment the owner had made in the
mark and on the commercial value and image of the mark itself,
protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for
their own benefit. 20 5 Thus, antidilution statutes protect a trade' 2 °6
mark's "selling power.
The premise behind a dilution action is that a trademark has
value beyond its ability to distinguish the source of goods or services.20 7 A strong, distinctive trademark may become a symbol of
consumer loyalty and goodwill rather than merely an indicator of
supplier identity. 20 8 It is the trademark owner's property rights in
that goodwill that are usurped when dilution takes place. Mr.
Schechter explained that the injury to a trademark caused by another's use is "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind or name by its use upon non'20 9
competing goods.
A.

The Dilution Results From a Trespass on Property Rights

A leading champion of the theory that a trademark can be injured by dilution, Beverly Pattishal1210 advocates that dilution is a
203. Schechter, RationalBasis, supra note 2, at 819, 829, 60 TRADEMARK REP.
at 338, 344.
204. Id. at 285, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 341.
205. Id. at 819, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 388. See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624-25, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 658, 661 (2d Cir. 1983).
206. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1030, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1963 (2d Cir. 1989); Sally Gee, Inc., 699
F.2d at 624-25, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 661.
207. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 817-19, 60 TRADEMARK REP.
at 336-38.
208. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community, College dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1024, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 1989).
209. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
342.
210. Mr. Pattishall has authored the following articles which discuss the antidilution statutes: ConstitutionalFoundations of American Trademark Law,
supra note 15; Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationalefor Trademark -
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trespass:
The tort of trademark or trade name dilution sounds not in deceit but
in trespass and is a wrong damaging to an incorporated property right
in the sanctity of whatever distinguishing quality may be associated
with one's mark or name. The right is to be protected against any tresor destroy the distinguishing quality of that
pass likely to diminish
211
mark or name.
The goodwill of a trademark is an exclusive property right and anyone who uses that goodwill without permission is committing a trespass. Another commentator has stated that "[t]he underlying
rationale of the dilution doctrine is that the gradual diminution or
whittling away of the value of a trademark, resulting from use by
another, constitutes an invasion of the senior user's property right
and goodwill in his mark and gives rise to an independent
212
wrong."
An analogy to the dilution invasion in the field of real property
is the situation where a second party continuously passes over the
owner's property. After a period of time the second party may
claim prescriptive easement rights allowing it right of continuous
passage over the subject property. This results in the owner losing
the full right to control his property. Additionally, any subsequent
passage of title by the owner will be subject to this easement, there213
Similar to the slowly
fore lessening the value of the property.
214
easement, dilution results in a subtle undermining of a
maturing
Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289 (1984) [hereinafter Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance]; The Dilution Rationalefor Trade-Mark Identity
Protection,Its Progressand Prospects, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 618 (1977), reprinted
in, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 607 (1977) [hereinafter Pattishall, DilutionRationale];
The U.S.A. Courts and the Prevention of Unfair Competition, 53 TRADEMARK
REP. 599 (1963); The Casefor Anti-dilution Trademark Statutes, 43 TRADEMARK
REP. 877 (1953) [hereinafter Pattishall, The Case].
Professor
211. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance, supra note 210, at 309.
Denicola challenges this distinction in the context of trademarks as speech and
the first amendment.
The first amendment thus does not operate to restrict the rights afforded
trademark owners under traditional doctrine. Trademark law, however,
has sometimes ventured beyond the confines of the confusion model.
Those seeking to extend the scope of trademark protection have championed models more closely allied with property than with tort. When consumer confusion ceases to be the touchstone, however, the accommodation
between trademark law and the first amendment becomes more
problematic.
Denicola, supra note 56, at 166.
212. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:13, cited in Tally-Ho, Inc., 889
F.2d at 1024 n.11, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137 n.11; Academy of Motion Pictures Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1435, 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
213. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (5th ed. 1979). See also R. CUNNINGHAM,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.7-8.8 (1984).

214. A prescriptive easement, much like adverse possession, requires, a statutory period of time to pass prior to a vesting of rights in the second party.
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trademark's delicate hold on the public mind and to its value. Over
time, the usurping use of the mark may destroy its value as a fanciful or arbitrary, strong and distinctive mark. The second user may
be able to claim that its mark has also captured part of the human
mind; and the trademark owner/first user will have lost his unencroached mark.
B.

Dilution - A Subtle, Infectious Injury to a Trademark

Judge Learned Hand recognized the intimacy of the mark and
the danger of dilution:
His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which
bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows
the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own
control. This is an injury even though the borrower does not tarnish it,
or divert any sales by its use, for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol
of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.2 15
The dilution injury is similar to an infection which "if allowed to
spread, it will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the
mark, '216 the mark's selling power. It is an evil which ignores the
primary purpose of a mark to create and retain custom, 2 17 and instead allows a "cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services
which feed upon the business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name." 218 It is the nature of dilution to "gnaw
away insidiously at the mark's value, ' 219 the consequence being a
loss of distinctiveness, a weakening of a mark's propensity to bring
220
to mind a particular product, service, or source of either.
The United States Trademark Association's recent proposal for
a federal antidilution statute2 21 contained the following definition
of dilution:
"Dilution" means the material reduction of the distinctive quality of a
famous mark through use of a mark by another person, regardless of
215. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (emphasis

added).
216. Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
217. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 822, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
339.
218. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
538, 544, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (1977).
219. Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 736 F.2d 1153, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984), remanded 610 F. Supp. 381

(1985).
220. Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1123

(S.D.N.Y. 1980); See also King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631,
638 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:13.
221. The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act (Public Law 100-667, effective
November 16, 1989) as proposed included a dilution provision. Although it was
passed by the Senate, it was taken out of the House version, and thus failed to

be included in the final compromise bill.
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the presence or absence of (a) competition between the users of the
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception arising from
mark, or 22(b)
2
that use.

The first state to adopt an antidilution statute was Massachusetts223 in 1947, and since then over half of the states have passed
antidilution statutes. 2 2

Unfortunately, dilution has been treated as

222. This definition was enacted as part of the antidilution statute enacted by
the State of Washington, S. Bill No. 5733, 51st Leg. 1989 Reg. Sess., 1989 Wash.,
effective July 23, 1989. The test of the statute is as follows:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity, to an injunction against another person's use in this state of a mark,
commencing after the mark becomes famous, which causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided
in this section. In determining whether a mark is famous and has distinctive quality, a court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to the following:
(1) Whether the mark is inherently distinctive or has become distinctive
through substantially exclusive and continuous use;
(2) Whether the duration and extent of use of the mark are substantial;
(3) Whether the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark are substantial;
(4) Whether the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark
is used is substantial;
(5) Whether the mark has substantial renown in its and in the other person's trading areas and channels of trade; and
(6) Whether substantial use of the same or similar marks is being made by
third parties.
Id. The owner shall be entitled only to injunctive relief in an action brought
under this section, unless the subsequent user willfully intended to trade on the
registrant's reputation or to cause dilution of the owner's mark. Id. If such
willful intent is proven, the owner shall also be entitled to the remedies set
forth in this chapter, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of
equity. Id. An extensive analysis of the new Washington statute and the Mead
Data case was recently published: Brownlee, Mead Data Central v. Toyota and
other ContemporaryDilution Cases: High Noon for Trademark Law's Misfit
Doctrine?, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 471 (1989).
223. Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (repealed by 1973
Acts ch. 897, § 2; replaced by MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. l10B, § 12 (1975)). The 1947
statute went through changes as it progressed through the legislature. The
Massachusetts House of Representatives passed the bill which protected only
"coined or peculiar" words (1947 House Bill No. 656 (Mass.)), but the Senate
redefined the protected words to include any marks of "distinctive quality" but
did not include any legislative history for the change. This lack of history has
wrought havoc on the development of the dilution theory. See, Handler, Are the
State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 275-76 (1985); Derenberg, supra note 68, at
453.
224. ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (Supp. 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-133 (Michie
1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-11i(c) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 495.151 (West 1988); GA. CODE § 106-115(b) [10-1-451] (Harrison Supp.
1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1987); LA. REV.
STAT. § 51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (1988); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. I1OB, § 12 (Law. Co-op 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333 (1989);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 25 (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061(1) (Vernon 1979); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1981 Reissue); N.H.
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a "nebulous concept" by courts and practitioners alike. 225 The coolness of the bar can be traced to the lack of definition in the
226
statutes.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (1987); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 647.107 [ch.122 § 2]
(Butterworth 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 112 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (Supp. 1988); 1989
Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 932 (Vernon) (effective June 14, 1989) (enacting TEX
Bus. & COM. § 16.29); 1989 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 72 (West) (effective July 23,
1989) (enacting WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.10).
Additionally, courts in two states which do not have antidilution statutes
have discussed common law causes of action. Michigan: Clairol, Inc. v. Boston
Discount Center of Berkley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1118 (6th Cir. 1979), and Indiana: Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 258 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Ind.
1966).
225. There has been a slow warming toward the dilution theory by both the
judiciary and the bar. This lack of zealousness can be traced to a variety of
factors: the absence of definitions for key terms; an uncertainty as to the actual
elements of the dilution claim; and a lack of experience with the theory. These
handicaps have been discussed in several articles: Shire, Dilutionv. Deception Are State Antidilution Laws as AppropriateAlternative to the Law of Infringement?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273, 283-296 (1987); Handler, supra note 223, at 28387; Griewe, Anti-dilution Statutes: A New Attack of ComparativeAdvertising,
72 TRADEMARK REP. 178, 183-84 (1982); Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance, supra
note 210, at 291 n.11; Day, State Anti-Dilution without a Statute, 54 TRADEMARK
REP. 590, 594 (1964); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:13(D).
There have been incidents where the bar has pled boiler plate state dilution
claims along with Lanham Act claims and failed to develop the merits of the
dilution claims in their records. This has apparently been a source of frustration to the judiciary. As one court succinctly put it: "Neither party has bothered. . . ." Gear, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 508, 512 (S.D. N.Y.
1987); see also Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 665 F. Supp.
1079, 1087 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). Another court proceeded by saying "[flor now, we
evaluate that provision without aid from its counsel." Coca-Cola Co. v. AlmaLeo U.S.A., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1489 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
The coupling of state dilution claims with Lanham Act claims has created a
situation where a large proportion of the law has been decided in the federal
courts. The Oregon Supreme Court stated "a federal court's interpretation of
state law may be persuasive but it is not controlling." Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v.
Lund, 294 Or. 493, 497 n.11, 659 P.2d 377, 382 n.11 (Or. 1983) (en banc).
226. The lack of certainty as to the parameters of antidilution statutes has
lead to questions of preemption. In Iowa, the courts have held that the Iowa
antidilution statute is preempted by the Lanham Act where the trademarks are
used in interstate commerce. They argue that the statute provides greater
rights to holders of trademarks than are available under the Lanham Act.
United States Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1368, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1126 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Comidas Exquisitos v. Carlos
McGee's Mexican Cafe, 602 F. Supp. 191, 198 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit found no direct conflict between the statutes (Lanham Act and Illinois antidilution statute) and no evidence of Congressional intent to preempt the state antidilution laws. Ringling Bros. - Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi - Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480,
8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Plasticolor Molded Prods. v.
Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1989). A New York court
stated: "It has long been recognized that in the area of trade names and trademarks remedies may be granted by both federal law and state law concurrently." Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467 F. Supp. 366, 378
(S.D. N.Y. 1979). But a district court in Illinois expressed concern that a nation-
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Until the recent passage of the Washington statute, 227 all of the
228
state statutes were based on the Model State Trademark Act.
The Model Act does not include any definitions of key terms and
the states developed very little legislative history. 229 The result has
been an inconsistent development and interpretation of the statutes. The passage of the Washington statute, with its definition of
dilution and list of factors to consider in determining distinctiveness, may fill the gap.
C. Elements for a Dilution Cause of Action
Over the years two basic elements for a dilution cause of action
have evolved: plaintiff must show that its mark is distinctive (or
has acquired secondary meaning) and that defendant's use of a similar mark has created a likelihood of dilution (defendant's mark
threatens to dilute the distinctiveness of plaintiff's mark or, alternatively, to tarnish the reputation of plaintiff's mark).230 Because
wide injunction could place an excessive burden on commerce. Hyatt Corp. v.
Hyatt Legal Services, 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
736 F.2d 1153, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669 (7th Cir.); cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019
(1984). Courts have also noted that dilution statutes can be preempted by the
Copyright Act. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1017, 1024 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
The issue of preemption has been explored in the following articles:
Brownlee, supra note 222, at 498-506; Pattishall, supra note 15; Handler, supra
note 223, at 283-87 (arguing that (1) interstate commerce is so broad that virtually any commercial activity is likely to be considered "in commerce" and (2)
that the Congressional objective of providing uniform trademark protection
with the Lanham Act should preempt state antidilution laws); Griewe, supra
note 225, at 189-203 (concluding that the first amendment protects informative
advertising from regulation under state antidilution laws but does not protect
persuasive comparative advertising).
227. For the text of the Washington Statute, see supra note 222 and accompanying text.
228. Most of the state statutes were patterned on the MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT, § 12, which reads:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law,
or a trade name valued at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive
relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or
the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at 22:4. Florida, Georgia and Illinois also prohibit dilution of "labels and forms of advertisement." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151
(West 1988); GA. CODE § 106-115(b) [10-1-451] (Harrison Supp. 1989); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (1987).
The first major deviation from the model is the Washington statute, supra
note 222, which was patterned after the proposed federal statute.
229. The New York legislative history discusses the need to protect famous
marks from occurrences such as "DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, Schlitz
varnish, Kodak pianos, Bulova gowns." 1954 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 49-50.
230. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1963 (2d Cir. 1989); Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2032 (9th Cir. 1988);
Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 493-94
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of the ambiguity of the original state statutes, additional conflicting
elements are being considered by various courts: proof that plaintiff owns a valid trademark registration; 23 1 proof that the defendant's trademark is a colorable imitation of the plaintiff's
trademarks; 232 evidence that defendant's use was without plaintiff's consent; 233 proof of specific or predatory intent; 234 proof that
use of the trademark by a second user decreases the mark's com(1st Cir. 1981); White Swan, Ltd. v. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1985, 1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Horn Abbot, Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla, Ltd., 601 F. Supp.
360 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Wedgwood Homes, 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377.
231. For cases which support the position that a trademark must be registered to be protected, see: Elite Personnel, Inc. v. Elite Personnel Servs., Inc.,
259 Ga. 192, 193, 378 S.E.2d 117, 119 (Ga. 1989) (statutory protection only available upon registration with Secretary of State). See also Diamond Supply Co. v.
Prudential Paper Prods. Co., 589 F. Supp. 470, 476 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (must be
a "valid" trademark).
For cases which support the position that a trademark need not be registered to be protected, see: Louis Ender, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 467 F.2d
327, 330 (2d Cir. 1972) (no requirement of registration with Patent Office); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257,
1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Hospitality Int'l, Inc. v. Northway Inn Corp., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Marks v. Cayo Hueso, Ltd., 437 So.2d
775 (Fla. App.3 Dist. 1983).
In the USTA's statement in support of S.1883 they noted a potential conflict between state antidilution statutes and a federal antidilution statute. The
state statutes may apply to common-law trademarks while a federal statute
would only cover registered marks. Although the federal statute would not
preempt state statutes which would continue to have jurisdiction to protect locally famous or distinctive marks, a valid federal registration could be a complete defense to a claim of dilution under state or common law. Eck, supra note
66, at 407.
232. Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 148889 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (the court found that the contours of the plaintiff's and defendant's bottles mirrored each other, each had circular bottoms, and vertical
lines covering the length of the bottle, with the result that the physical resemblances sufficiently demonstrated the requisite dilution).
233. E&J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1675
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (court found that defendant knew that plaintiff wine producer
would object to the use of it's surname mark on cheese products).
234. For cases which support the position that specific intent to capitalize on
strength and advertising value of trademark is a relevant factor, see: McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1281, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1761,
1771 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); E&J Gallo Winery, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663, 1675
(court found that defendant knew the plaintiff would object and that a mark
integrating plaintiff's surname would have automatic consumer appeal) (citing
Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 626, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 658,
662 (2d Cir. 1983)).
For cases which support the position that predatory intent is an element,
see: Sage Realty Corp. v. Sage Group, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 134, 143 (S.D. N.Y. 1989)
(citing Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d at 625-26, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 662). See also
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1206-09 (E.D.
N.Y. 1983).
For cases which support the position that predatory intent is not a necessary element but it is a factor favoring relief, see: TNT Limited v. TNT Messen-
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mercial value;235 whether the products on which the marks are
used can be competitive products; 236 and proof of consumer
237
confusion.

ger Serv., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 201, 208, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649, 1655 (S.D. N.Y.
1989) (citing Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d at 625, 217 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 662).
For cases which support the position that a lack of predatory intent is not a
good faith defense, see: Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956 (D.C. Cal.
1977), off'd, 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980).
235. Freedom Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1186, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 123, 129-30 (11th Cir. 1985); Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp.,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1527, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
236. For cases which support the position that the statute does not apply
where products are competitive, see: Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia
Group, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (S.D. N.Y. 1987); Smithkline Beckman Corp.
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 591 F. Supp. 1229, 1246-47 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) aff'd mem.,
755 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1985); Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F.
Supp. 939, 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1979).
For cases which support the position that the statute may apply where
products are competitive, see: Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432,
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Gaston's White River Resort v. Rush, 701 F. Supp. 1409, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (W.D. Ark. 1988); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 617
F. Supp. 316, 317 (E.D. N.Y. 1985); reh'g, 617 F. Supp. 316, 318-319 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 856 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
For cases which support the position that competition is of no significance,
see: Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir.
1987); Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1343 (C.D.
Cal. 1989); Sage Realty Corp., 711 F. Supp. at 143; Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal
Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Allied Maintenance,
Inc. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 544-45, 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (1977).
For cases which support the position that competition is not an element,
see: Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1025, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1138 (11th Cir. 1989); Andy Warhol Enterprises v.
Time, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 760, 768 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (citing Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d
at 624, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 661); Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the
Carolinas, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 621, 629 n.3, (N.D. Ga. 1988); Horn Abbot, Ltd. v.
Sarsaparilla, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 360, 366 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Tio Pepe, Inc. v. El Tio
Pepe de Miami Restaurant, Inc., 523 So.2d 1158, 1160, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1228,
1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). See also Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra
note 210, at 613; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:13(C).
237. For cases which support the position that confusion is not a necessary
element, see: Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d at 624, 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 661; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675
F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982); Robarb, Inc., 696 F. Supp. at 629 n.3; PPG Industries, Inc. v. Clinical Data, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 604, 606 (D.C. Mass. 1985); Horn
Abbot, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. at 366; Golden Door,Inc., 437 F. Supp. 956; Allied Maintenance, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d at 544-45, 369 N.E.2d at 1165-66, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
For cases which support the position that the likelihood of confusion must
be shown, see: Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 788 F.2d 1352, 1362, 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 346, 353 (9th Cir. 1985)(en banc); Sardi's Restaurant Corp. v.
Sardi, 755 F.2d 719, 723, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 23, 25 (9th Cir. 1985); EA Engineering Science & Technology v. Environmental Audit, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1295, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1989); DCA Food Indust., Inc. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc.,
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(i) Distinctiveness and Strength of the Mark
"The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for
protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with which it has been used.' '23s In his article,
Mr. Schechter advocates protection for coined, 23 9 arbitrary, 240 or
fanciful 24 1 words or phrases as they are added to the human vocabulary by their owners and which from their inception are associated
with a single product, giving rise in the public consciousness to an
242
impression of that product's excellence.
Mr. Schechter's limited field of protection has not been widely
embraced. Mr. Pattishall questions the desirability of limiting the
protection of a mark's "commercial magnetism" to only those
mark's which are coined, unique, fanciful, invented, or arbitrary
marks, finding that there is no social or commercial justification for
the limitation.243 The rule as Mr. Pattishall states it is "[t]hat
which may be diluted must have a distinctive quality. ' '244 If coined,
unique, arbitrary, fanciful and original marks are not exclusively
definitive of distinctive marks, then what is a distinctive mark?
The recently enacted Washington statute 24 5 enumerates a set
of relevant factors for determining whether a mark is "famous and
has distinctive quality:"
470 F. Supp. 574, 582 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Shadow Box, Inc. v. Drecq, 71 Misc. 2d
733, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Supp. Ct. 1972).
See Shire, supra note 225, at 274 (noting that for years "dilution remained
shackled by a judicially imposed requirement that plaintiff demonstrate likelihood of confusion").
238. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
342.
239. Coined words such as POLAROID and KODAK are created solely to
identify a product. Wedgwood Homes Inc. v. Lund, 294 Or. 493, 498, 659 P.2d
377, 378 (1983). 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 11:2.
When a mark is first coined it has no commercial significance. It is the use
of the mark that engenders identifying significance. Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra note 210, at 631.

240. An arbitrary mark, such as V-8 (a beverage made from juice of eight
vegetables), is the use of existing words applied to a product in an unexpected
and non-descriptive fashion. Wedgwood Homes, 294 Or. at 499, 659 P.2d at 379
(citing Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945); 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 11:3.)
241. Fanciful marks are those that are "coined" or invented for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 11:2.
See Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562,
568, (C.D. Cal. 1986), qff'd, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (GODIVA chocolates).
242. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 829, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
344.
243. Pattishall, DilutionRationale, supra note 210, at 630.

244. Id.
245. S. Bill No. 5733, supra note 222.
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(1) Whether the mark is inherently distinctive through substantially
exclusive and continuous use;
(2) Whether the duration and extent of use of the mark are
substantial;
(3) Whether the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of
the mark are substantial;
(4) Whether the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used is substantial;
(5) Whether the mark has substantial renown in its and in the other
person's trading areas and channels of trade; and
(6) Whether substantial
use of the same or similar marks is being
246
made by third parties.
Over the history of the antidilution statutes, additional factors have
been developed for determining whether a mark is distinctive: (1)
whether the name was original with the plaintiff; 247 (2) whether
the name acquired widespread reputation and goodwill through the
plaintiff's efforts; 248 and (3) whether the defendant's name or mark
2 49
was virtually identical.

Interestingly, some relevant factors actually are the same components which create goodwill: the length of time the mark has
been used, the scope of advertising and promotion, the nature and
extent of the business, and the scope of the first user's
25o
reputation.
246. Id.
247. Kern v. WKQK Radio, 175 Ill. App. 3d 624, 635, 529 N.E.2d 1149, 1156-57,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1131, 1137 (1st Dist. 1988) (the court held that although the
marks were virtually identical, and plaintiff had presented some evidence that
the mark had acquired a reputation and goodwill, the plaintiffs had failed to
show that they had originated the mark they sought to protect).
Professor McCarthy noted that "[t]he court seems to have used the inappropriate word "originality" when what it was struggling to express was the
requirement that the mark be "strong" enough to be diluted." 2 J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 15, at § 24:14 (1989 Supp. at 73).
248. Wedgwood Homes, 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377 (the Oregon Supreme Court
held that Plaintiff had developed distinctive quality over 25 years of business
and substantial advertising programs which promoted the "quality, styling and
flair of plaintiff's residential construction," which instilled consumer
recognition).
249. Kern, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 635, 529 N.E.2d at 1156-57, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1137 (citing Ye Olde Tavern Cheese Prods., Inc. v. Planter's Peanuts Div.,
Standard Brands, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 200, 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 244 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
aff'd, 394 F.2d 833, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (7th Cir. 1967)). See Mead Data
Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028-29, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1963 (2d Cir. 1989) (court explained that Mr. Schechter
intended that statutory violations be limited to the unauthorized use of identical marks) (citing Schechter, RationalBasis, supra note 2, at 830-33, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 345-47; Shire, supra note 225, at 273-76).
Compare Mead Data Central, 875 F.2d at 1029, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964
("We hold that the marks must be 'very' or 'substantially' similar and that, absent such similarity, there can be no viable claim of dilution."); Community
Federal Sav. & Loans, Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034 (11th Cir. 1982).
250. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prod., 787 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir.
1986); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc. 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1487, 1488
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We can presume that there are marks which from their inception have questionable strength - marks which are saturated and
already diluted at the time the owner chose the mark. These marks
are words which are already used in various fields of trade and commence, 251 are surnames, 252 are geographic terms, 253 are descriptive,
or are generic. 254 By virtue of their origins some marks may never
develop a distinctiveness which will entitle them to protection from
255
dilution.
Weak marks are by definition diluted, and their possessors are
in poor positions to invoke applicable antidilution statutes. 256 If a
trademark owner chooses to develop a weak mark, he accepts that
weakness with the risk that others using the mark could further
dilute the mark as applied to his product. The choice of a weak
mark such as MUSTANG for a bicycle will not prevent others from
using it on mobile homes, cars, airplanes, tractors, motorcycles,
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 736 F.2d 1153, 1158, 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669, 672 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1019).
251. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718
F.2d 1201, 1210 (1st Cir. 1983) (court held no dilution of mark ASTRA in medical field where there were over 100 registrations of mark in other fields); Allied
Maintenance, Inc. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d
1162, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977) (court held that the mark ALLIED was too widely
used in commerce to be eligible for protection).
252. Exclusive rights in a surname per se cannot be established without evidence of long and exclusive use which changes its significance to the public
from a surname of an individual to a mark for particular goods or services. See
In re Etablissements Darty et fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 625, 653
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Hoover Co. v. Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd., 674 F. Supp. 460, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (court held that although plaintiff had
used the mark for 75 years and it is distinctive, there is no apparent distinction
for determining dilution between defendant's name and other corporate names
using HOOVER which plaintiff has not challenged).
But see Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1158, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 672 (court held
the surname HYATT sufficiently distinctive to be eligible for statutory
protection).
253. Geographically descriptive terms which indicate the origin of the goods
are "inherently descriptive." Therefore they can be protected, as upon use they
can prove they have become distinctive. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at
§ 14:1. See American Bank of Merritt Island v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 455 So.
2d 443 (Fla. App. Dist. 1984).
254. Generic terms are those which are inherently nondistinctive because
they name the product itself and not the source of the goods. 1 J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 15, at § 3:1, 12:1. "Genericness is determined by the primary significance of the term to the purchasing public, not purchaser motivation." USTA
Commission Paper,supra note 128, at 379; Gear, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 670
F. Supp. 508 (.S.D.N.Y. 1987) (GEAR); WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320 (8th
Cir. 1984) (OPRY).
255. Handler, supra note 223, at 278.
256. Exquisite Form Inds., Inc. v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F. Supp.
403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243
F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957).
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cranes, and clothing.25 7 But what makes a mark distinctive and
strong so that it can be protected by the antidilution statutes?
There is a wide range of opinion as to the level of distinctiveness and strength that a mark must have to be protected. 25 As
mentioned, concern has been exhibited about Mr. Schechter's limitation on relief to coined, arbitrary, or fanciful words or phrases,
with queries about whether the restriction would limit the cause of
action to large and powerful corporations. 25 9 Cogent examples of
"unquestionably distinctive" marks are: EXXON; 26° POLAROID;
and the McDonald's Corporation's "Mc" prefix which is used with a
generic food item. 261 To be considered distinctive, a mark must
262
have come to be identified with its owner's products or services.
It is the uniqueness of powerful and famous marks that render
them vulnerable to injuries that the less famous would simply not
suffer.
There are a number of New York cases in which the courts
have used the legislative history to conclude that only the most famous and celebrated trademarks may be diluted. 26 3 Numerous
courts have required that the mark be either unique, arbitrary,
2
coined, or fanciful, or have acquired secondary meaning. 6
This concept of protecting marks that have overcome a lack of
inherent distinctiveness by establishing secondary meaning was not
proposed by Mr. Schechter. Professor McCarthy describes secondary meaning as "a mental association in buyers' minds between
the alleged mark and a single source of the product. ' 265 Secondary
meaning occurs "when the name and business become synonymous
257. Example from Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 258 F.
Supp. 67 (S.D. Ind. 1966) (note: Indiana has no dilution statute).
258. For a discussion of the anti-dilution statutes and their ambiguity on the
required levels of distinctiveness, see Brownlee, supra note 222, at 483-87.
259. See Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 702 F.
Supp. 1031, 1042, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442, 1451 (S.D. N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 875 F.2d
1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (2d Cir. 1989); Brownlee, supra note 222, at 485.
260. Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy Resources, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. N.Y.
1981).
261. McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 1 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1761 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("In this case the Court has no hesitation in finding
that McDonald's owns a "family of marks", both registered and unregistered,
whose common characteristic is the use of "Mc" or "Mac" as a formative").
262. Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1487, 1488
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153, 1157,
222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984)).
263. P.F. Cosmetique S.A. v. Minnetonka Inc., 605 F. Supp. 662, 672, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 86, 92-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Lord Jeff Knitting Co. v. Warnaco
Inc., 594 F. Supp. 579, 582, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 671, 672-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
264. Midwest Research Inst. v. S & B Promotions Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1007,
1017, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
265. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 15:2; See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982).
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in the public mind; and submerges the primary meaning of the
name ... in favor of its meaning as a word identifying that business." 266 It is a question of fact whose proof depends on a number
of factors, including: use of the mark by third parties; 267 proof of
actual confusion;2 68 perception of dealers, buyers, customers, and
270
professionals;2 69 amount, nature, and coverage of advertising;
271
and length of time the mark has been used.
The courts require proof beyond mere advertising expenses
and sales to support the contention that a mark has secondary
meaning. 272 What is required is information about how the public
associates the mark to the product.273 Marks with widespread use
and heavy advertising may develop secondary meaning in a narrow
field. In Dreyfus Fund,Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada,274 the court
stated "[t]hough Dreyfus' lion marks are not so unique and arbitrary as to deserve protection in fields totally unrelated to Dreyfus'
activities, it is a suggestive use that has acquired great strength in
'275
the financial arena.
In Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 276 the court recognized that
small local firms may expend proportionally equal amounts of effort and money as large firms.2 77 Such efforts can result in a "high
278
degree of local fame" that has a protectible commercial value.
In Arkansas, the courts have distinguished between the use of
similar marks in businesses that deal with the general public and in
businesses that do not. Where marks are in use with the general
public, the courts require that a distinctive mark have acquired sec266. Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 294 Or. 493, 499, 659 P.2d 377, 379 (1983)
(citing Visser v. Macres, 214 Cal. App. 2d 249, 253, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367, 369 (1963)).
267. Midwest Research Institute, 677 F. Supp. 1007, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 15:2-15:9.
271. Id.
272. P.F. Cosmetique, 605 F. Supp. at 672.
273. Id. at 672-73.
274. 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
275. Id. at 1125.
276. 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377 (1983).
277. Id. at 381.
278. Id. In Mead Data Central, 875 F.2d at 1033, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1966, Judge Sweet in his concurring opinion noted that the measure of the
mark's recognition for proof of secondary meaning is with the consuming public
and not the general public.
Conversely, the majority in Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1965 (2d Cir. 1989),

acknowledged that while the plaintiff had developed a strong mark in the field
of computerized research (76% identification by attorneys), only one percent of
the general public recognized the mark, that fact coupled with the sophistica-

tion of attorneys, lead the court to conclude there would be no dilution of the
mark LEXIS (computerized legal research) by the mark LEXUS (automobile).
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ondary meaning to be protected.279 Where the businesses do not
deal with the general public, the courts will allow greater similarity
in marks 28 0 but will not protect descriptive marks that have not ac28l
quired a secondary meaning.
Although the statutes do not call for any particular level of
strength, commentators and courts have stated that the mark must
be particularly strong to be able to support a dilution claim. 28

2

Pro-

28 3
fessor McCarthy observed "[o]nly strong marks need apply."
This requirement seems to be no more than a common sense reflection on the fact that a common type or little-known mark is in fact
inherently "diluted" and the presence of another similar mark
could hardly affect the negligible public perception of the original
2 s4

mark.

A mark that is strong because of its fame or uniqueness is more
likely to be remembered and more likely to be associated in the
public mind with a greater breadth of products than a mark that is
weak. 28 5 Distinctiveness is valuable to the trademark owner be-

cause it identifies his product to consumers both effectively and positively. 286 To call a mark distinctive is to imply that it is the product
of fancy or an arbitrary choice.2 87 Generally, "distinctiveness will
only be found where the work has acquired a widespread reputation
and goodwill through plaintiff's efforts." 2-8
A tacit problem in the dilution analysis is the movement back
and forth between the dilution cause of action and likelihood of
confusion infringement action of the terms "distinctiveness" and
279. Gaston's White River Resort v. Ruxh, 701 F. Supp. 1409, 1440, 8
U.S.P.Q,2d (BNA) 1209, 1215 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
280. Say-a-Stop, Inc. v. Sav-a-Stop, Inc., 230 Ark. 319, 322 S.W.2d 454, 121
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 232 (1959).
281. Pullan v. Fulbright, 287 Ark. 21, 695 S.W.2d 830, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 493
(1985).
282. White Swan Ltd. v. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985,
1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.
Cal. 1985); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:14.
283. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 24:14.
284. White Swan Ltd., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1991.
285. E&J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1673
(E.D. Cal. 1989); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
276, 192 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 563 (7th Cir. 1976). But see B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v.
Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 729, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1719, 1721 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
286. Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1123
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
287. P.F. Cosmetique S.A. v. Minnetonka, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 662, 672, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
288. Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1488
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Ye Ole Tavern Cheese Prods., Inc. v. Planters, Peanuts
Div., Standard Brands, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 200, 208, 151 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 244, 250

(N.D. Ill. 1966), of'd, 394 F.2d 833, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (7th Cir. 1967)).
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"strength. '28 9 Distinctiveness in the antidilution realm is being
evaluated in much the same way as a mark's strength is evaluated
in the area of likelihood of confusion.290 The federal trademark infringement standards relating to the strength of a mark were not
established with the concerns of the antidilution statutes in
29 1
mind.
Some courts have distinguished between "distinctive" marks
and "strong" marks by noting that under infringement "[t]he extent to which a mark is protectible is a function of its power to identify goods sold under the mark as originating from a particular
source. This power is referred to as a mark's "strength."' 92 Therefore, the analysis of a dilution case differs from that of an infringement case. 293 The dilution case focuses "on the dilution of a mark's
distinctive quality" while infringement looks "to the likelihood to
294
consumer confusion."
Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the
orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a
mark may be debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which, if allowed
to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising
295
value of the mark.

The dilution statutes extend "the protection afforded trade-marks
and trade names beyond that provided by actions for infringement
''296
and unfair competition.
(ii) Threat of Dilution to the Distinctiveness of the Mark
The cause of action for dilution relates to the protection of a
mark's selling power. 29 7 "The essence of dilution is the watering
down of the potency of a mark and the gradual debilitation of its
289. See Pattishall, The Case, supra note 210, at 889.
290. P.F. Cosmetique, 605 F. Supp. at 672.
291. See Pattishall, The Case, supra note 210, at 892.
292. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Dizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131, 202 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979); TNT Limited v. TNT Messenger Serv., Inc., 724 F.
Supp. 201, 204, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649, 1652 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
293. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1024, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 1989).
294. Id.
295. Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836, 138 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 265, (7th
Cir. 1963); Hing Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631, 638 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Gaston's White River Resort v. Ruxh, 701 F. Supp. 1409, 1439, 8
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 1215 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
296. Allied Maintenance Inc., v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
538, 544, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (1977).
297. Under the statutes patterned after the Model Trademark Act only injunctive relief was available. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 12
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selling power."' 8 The focus is on the damage of the mark's inherent value as a symbol, rather than on whether consumers have been
misled as to origin or sponsorship. 29
A New York Court prevented a restaurant owner from using
the TIFFANY mark saying:
The risk of detraction may be a risk of an erosion of the public's identification of this very strong mark with the plaintiff alone, thus diminuniqueness, effectiveness and prestigious
ishing its distinctiveness,
3 °
connotations. 0
The injury occurs when the first user no longer comes immediately

to mind on the hearing of the mark.30'
In Augusta National, Inc., v. The Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company,3° 2 the court stated that if the defendant's
mark "Ladies' Masters at Moss Creek Plantation" is used there was
"reasonable certainty that the value of plaintiff's mark [THE MASTERS] would be eroded; a little now, more later, until the magic of
the Masters will be mortally dissipated if not completely
'303
dispelled.
It is a blurring of the mental image that anyone who had dealt
with or knew of the first user would have. 3 ° 4 Although a trademark owner does not need to prove actual injury to sustain a dilution claim, the amount of money lost is relevant.30 5 Since proof of
likelihood of dilution in the public's mind can be derived from a loss
of money, evidence that two singing groups, using the same name,
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1488 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv.,
736 F.2d 1153, 1157, 222 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 699, 671 (7th Cir. 1984).
But cf. Berghoff Restaurant Co. v. Lewis W. Berghoff, Inc., 499 F.2d 1183,
1185 (7th Cir. 1974) (injunctive relief under antidilution statute not mandatory).
Since the passage of the Washington statute less than a year ago monetary damages are now potentially available.
298. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc. 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1209
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
299. E&J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1675
(E.D. Cal. 1989); Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793, 210
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1981).
300. Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 844, 143 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 2, 8 (D. Mass. 1964).
301. As Mr. Schechter so eloquently described it:
It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.
The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the
public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with which it
has been used.
Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 342.
302. 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 211, 222 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
303. Id. at 222.
304. Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 550, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 215,
219 (7th Cir. 1982) (Judge Posner discussing Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.).
305. Marshak v. Sheppard, 666 F. Supp. 590, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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could command lower fees when they appeared in the same area
was relevant.3s 6 Additionally, when a professional group stipulated
that it had suffered no monetary damage and that their attendance
had actually increased, the court concluded that they had failed to
30 7
make out a claim for trademark dilution.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed a decision holding that where two
seed manufacturers had similarly shaped and colored signs marking
their fields, which most people would only observe while passing by
in a car, the subsequent user's sign created a "likelihood of dilution"
of the distinctive quality of the senior user's sign.308 The court felt
that the condition under which the sign was viewed was a factor. 3° 9
Dilution constitutes a less immediately discernible injury to the
310
trademark by impairing its effectiveness as a selling device.
(iii) The Lack of Ability to Control Quality is an Injury to
Business Reputation
The words "injury to business reputation" are part of many
state statutes. 31 ' These words crept into the dilution statutes at the
earliest moment: the phrase was introduced as substitute language
to the proposed Massachusetts statute in 1947.312 It has been part of
the history of dilution theory every since. The concept of "injury to
business reputation" has been muddied by the fact that many courts
3' 3
and practitioners refer to it as "tarnishment."
There are two types of situations in which the courts have examined allegations of an injury to business reputation.3 1 4 The first
is where the trademark owner or senior user lacks the ability to
control the quality of products dissimilar to his own but which bear
his mark. The second is where unsavory associations are made to
306. Id.
307. Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1435, 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
308. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Wilson Hybrids, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D.
Iowa 1982), aff'd 733 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1984).

309. Id.
310. 3A CALLMANN, supra note 49, at § 21.11.
311. See supra note 224, for general listing of statutes. In a number of states,
including New York, Texas, Tennessee, and Maine, the state statutes are titled
"Injury to Business Reputation."
312. See Shire, supra note 225, at 278-80.
313. The term "tarnishment" confuses and distracts the court and practitioners from the actual nature of the dilution action. It means to dull the lustre or
to sully or dim the reputation. While to "dilute" is to reduce in strength by
addition of other matter and to "whittle" is to reduce by subtractions. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1184, 317, 1328 (1979) (for the definitions
of "tarnishment," "dilute," and "whittle" respectively).

314. See also Wolf, Trademark Dilution: The Need for Reform, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 311, 318 (1985) (arguing that "injury to business reputation which
occurs other than by reference to a mark is outside the proper scope of antidilution law").
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the mark or the mark is the subject of a parody. These are two
incongruous applications of the dilution theory. Only the first properly falls within the parameters of a dilution cause of action.
A "diluting" injury to business reputation occurs when the defendant loses control over the goodwill and reputation that is associated with his mark. On a counterclaim in Arthur Young, Inc. v.
Arthur Young & Co.,315 the court held that the subsequent use of
the ARTHUR YOUNG mark was likely to dilute the distinctiveness
of the mark. The mark's distinctiveness had been created by the
company through extensive promotions and long-term efforts devoted to protecting and enhancing the image of the mark.3 16 In examining the injury to business reputation, the court noted that the
evidence included the fact that the subsequent user charged contingency fees, which are considered unethical according to counter317
claimant's understanding of the executive search profession.
Consequently, if the plaintiff was allowed to continue to use the
mark, the counterclaimant would have no control over the quality
of the services rendered, therefore diluting the reputation of the
mark and its goodwill.
A California court held that the use of "JOSEPH GALLO" as a
trademark on the defendants' cheese threatened to tarnish the reputation of the GALLO trademark because the defendants were not
taking the care that a responsible owner of a famous mark would
take to assure the purity and safety of its product.31 8 In this case,
the court explored factors that it considered relevant to a finding
that the defendants' use of a mark similar to that of the plaintiff's
would cause an injury to plaintiff's business reputation:
(1) Risk of a public report of substantial public health problems - real
or suspected - in connection with a branded cheese product. Such a
report would likely have devastating consequences for the brand
involved.
(2) The self-regulated nature of the industry. State and federal supervision provide regulatory minimums, but owners of well-respected
trademarks adopt and police their own quality control programs to
protect their brands from injury that can result from quality control

problems.
(3) Whether defendants employed enough people to insure quality
control.
315. 579 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
316. Id. at 390.
317. Id.
318. E&J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 1675;
See Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562,
568 (C.D. Cal. 1986); CPC Int'l v. Balzola Foods Corp., 224 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 85, 89
(S.D. Fla. 1984); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Mann Theaters, 195
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191, 175 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 56, 61 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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(4) Whether defendants had quality control procedures and specifications in force to ensure quality control.
normally
(5) Whether defendants followed quality control procedures
31 9
observed by the owner of an established consumer brand.
A reading of these factors illustrates that injury to business reputation is directly related to the inability of the plaintiff to monitor the
quality of the products being sold under his reputation.3 20 Without
dilution protection, the trademark owner is subject to being judged
by the consumer's experience with the subsequent user's product.
In several additional cases, the courts have examined the quality of the defendant's products to determine whether there was an
injury to business reputation. They failed to find tarnishment
where there was no showing that defendant's goods or services are
substandard.3 2 1 In Lever Bros. Co. v. American Bakeries Co.,322 the
plaintiff contended that its AUTUMN mark for margarine could be
disparaged by customer dissatisfaction with defendant's AUTUMN
GRAIN mark for bread. The court noted that although the mark
was arbitrary, it was in common use for food and drink products.
Although the defendant conceded that it had no control over some
of the bread sold under its mark, the court found that the satisfactory quality of the defendant's product was solidly demonstrated,
and there was no basis for a finding that continued sale of defend32 3
ant's product would diminish the value of the plaintiff's mark.
In a greymarket situation, the court held that there was no injury to business reputation where the defendants were selling only
genuine YAMAHA products. 324 The plaintiff, Yamaha-America,
claimed that there was an injury arising out of the fact that the
defendants did not back Yamaha products with the peripherals (extensive warranty and consumer education programs) as did the
plaintiff. Conversely, the defendants maintained they sold only
genuine Yamaha products and consumers received defendants' warranty and a statement confirming that defendants imported the
products. 325 The court held that, because of these steps, any dissat319. See E&J Gallo Winery, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669 (the defendant's
cheeses were at risk of carrying the pathogens salmonella and listeria which
could cause epidemic illness and even multiple deaths).
320. Id. at 1675. See also Grey, 650 F. Supp. at 1175, 231 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 568
(court found that the use of confusingly similar trademarks DOGIVA and CATIVA on treats meant for animal consumption injured the business reputation
associated with the mark GODIVA which was used on premium quality food
products meant for human consumption).
321. TNT Limited v. TNT Messenger Serv. Inc., 724 F. Supp. 201, 208, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649, 1655 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
322. 537 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
323. Id. at 255.
324. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. ABC Int'l Traders Corp., 703 F. Supp. 1398,
1403 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
325. Id. at 1402.
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isfaction felt by the consumers would cause an injury to the defend326
ants' name and not to the that of the plaintiff.
And finally, the court in Home Box Office v. Showtime/The
Movie Channel327 held that the use of plaintiff's mark in defendant's advertising, which was a campaign to get consumers to
purchase both services, was not going to damage plaintiff's reputation. 2s The court reasoned that there was no evidence that the
services offered by the defendant were inferior in quality, and the
329
plaintiff would actually benefit from increased sales.
Each of these cases fails to come to terms with the concept that
the trademark owner should have the right to control the quality of
any product used in conjunction with his mark. Where the court
refuses to recognize the right of the trademark owner to control the
quality of any product bearing his mark, the court is creating a situation synonymous to a "naked license" for the benefit of the second
user.
These holdings must be critically questioned because the injury
to business reputation is based on the essential property conception
of trademark rights; its emphasis is on the right of a trademark
owner to maintain the standard of quality with which his mark is
associated under his exclusive control. These decisions consider
only a moment in time. They do not reflect the long-term actions
and quality standards of the subsequent user. As such, they block
the ability of the trademark owner to control the reputation of his
mark in the future.
VIII.
A.

ROAD-BLOCKS TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF MR. SCHECHTER'S
THEORY DEVELOPING IN THE CASE-LAW

"TarnishmentThrough Parody" Is a Play on a Trademark's
Source Function

The antidilution statutes have come under attack by those who
say that the tarnishment rationale potentially "expand[s] the scope
of the antidilution statute far beyond the frontiers of commerce and
deep into the realm of expression. '330 This criticism of the statutes
is fueled by the series of cases which were brought under the vari326. Id. at 1402-03.
327. 665 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).
328. Id. at 1087.
329. Id.
330. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987).
See also Denicola, supra note 56, 181-193; Note, Trademark Parody: A FairUse
and FirstAmendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1092-1099 (1986) (discussing the problem of trademark parody and the dilution theory of trademark
protection).
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ous statutes and relate to "tarnishment through parody.F331
"Tarnishment through parody" resembles dilution in that the
purported injury results from the blurring of a mark's distinctiveness by the addition of a new set of associations in consumer's
332
minds.
[T]he keystone to parody is imitation. It is hard to imagine, for example, a successful parody of Time magazine that did not reproduce
Time's trademarked red border. A parody must convey two simultaneous - and contradictory messages: that it is the original, but also that it
is not the original and is instead a parody. To the extent that it does
only the former but not the latter, it is not only a poor parody but also
vulnerable333 under trademark law, since the customer will be
confused.
Therefore, the thrust of parody is to poke fun at a mark by highlighting the differences between the products. 334 When a parody is
successful, it becomes evident to the consumer that the trademark
335
owner is not sponsoring the product.
In Tetley Inc.,336 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's PETLEY FLEA BAGS would tarnish the affirmative associations which
their mark had come to convey. The court held that the broad humor employed by the defendant served to prevent "the type of blurring which might result from a more subtle or insidious effort at
' 337
humor at plaintiff's expense.
Examples of unsuccessful parodies can be seen in examining
the various attacks on the COCA-COLA trademark.3 38 The CocaCola Company has displayed a tenaciousness for protecting its
marks and their goodwill from any "likelihood of injury to reputa331. See L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 32-34. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc., v.
Pussycat Theaters, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Chemical Corp of Am. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965
(1963); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F.
Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Gucci Shop's Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp.
838 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 175
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
332. Kravitz, supra note 53, at 143, 79 TRADEMARK REP. at 616.
333. Cliff's Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1291-92 (2d Cir. 1989).
334. L.L. Bean, 811 F.2d at 34.
335. Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Company of Boca, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1314
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp.,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).
336. Tetley, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
337. Id. at 794.
338. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143 (1920); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 56 (E.D. N.Y. 1972); CocaCola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
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tion." They have gone after any association of their mark with
cocaine:
To associate such a noxious substance as cocaine with plaintiff's wholesome beverage as symbolized by its "Coca-Cola" trademark and format
would clearly have a tendency
to impugn that product and injure plain339
tiff's business reputation.
But the injury here is one of perception. The company does not
want its name publicly linked with cocaine or its mark represented
as a source of cocaine. 340 This is different from the injury which the
dilution theory as proposed by Schechter was meant to protect. The
dilution injury is the insidious cancerous confusion which seeps into
the consumer's mind by associating the second user's product,
which carries the same mark as that of the first user, with the first
user's product.
This form of tarnishment does not belong under the protection
of the antidilution statutes. 341 Parody does not deal with the trademark owner's lack of control over the quality of the second user's
product which the consumer is unwittingly purchasing. It deals instead with a play on the trademark's function as an indicator of
product source, which is not the function protected by dilution.
B.

The Antidilution Statutes Do Not Prevent Genericness

There is a group of commentators who believe that the antidilution statutes provide an avenue to protect a trademark from
genericness. 342 This belief is based on defining "dilution by genericization" as "occur[ring] when a mark becomes known as the common descriptive name of a product" 343 with a resulting
339. Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp. at 1189, 175 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 59. Such a
sensitivity on the part of Coca-Cola is not unfounded because the Coca-Cola
name is "derived from the Andean coca leaf plant and the African cola nut,
extracts of which gave the beverage its flavor. The coca leaf is the source of
cocaine." Id. at 1189, n.7, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 59 n.7. See also Alma-Leo
US.A., 719 F. Supp. at 728 n.3, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 n.3.
340. See also Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (subsequent use of DOGIVA and CATIVA, pet
treats, injures business reputation of GODIVA which was meant for human
consumption).
341. There are other potential avenues available to protect a trademark
against tarnishment. The USTA Commission formed to review the trademark
system suggests "that trademark tarnishment and disparagement are separate
forms of legal wrong, and recommends amending Section 43(a) to deal with
them." USTA Commission Paper,supra note 128, at 455 n.134.
342. Brownlee, supra note 222, at 480; Griewe, supra note 225, at 187. See
also Zeller v. LaHood, 627 F. Supp. 55, 60 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (court held that the
term GONDOLA as applied to a sandwich was beginning to acquire "generic
overtones" and was a "classic example of dilution").
343. Brownlee, supra note 222, at 479.
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abandonment due to the mark's loss of significance. 344 The test of
whether a mark has become generic is "whether its primary significance is a product category or genus rather than a product's source
or producer. '3 45 Or, more simply, the court asks: has the term
"come to be understood as referring... to the genus of which the
particular product ... is a species?" 346 For "[w]hen a trademark
primarily denotes a product, not the product's producer, the trademark is lost. ' 3 4 7 It is generic.
The genericness doctrine prevents anti-competitive misuse of
trademarks. 348 The injury is manifested by a loss of the automatic
association in the public mind with the source of the product, "instead caus[ing] a mark to represent a product type that could originate from any number of sources." 349 The dilution theory was not
meant to protect a trademark from an injury resulting from a confusion of source or a loss of the source-indicating function. 35° It is
instead meant to protect a mark's association in the public mind
with the excellence of any single product from a blurring of that
association by the mark's placement on dissimilar products.3 5 1 To
claim that antidilution law is intended to prevent the genericization
3 52
of a trademark is over-reaching its boundaries.
C. First Amendment Rights Are Safe
A major concern of the naysayers of the dilution cause of action
is whether it infringes first amendment rights.353 It is in the areas
of parody, comparison advertising, and commercial speech where
the discussions of the tension between protection from dilution and
first amendment rights have occurred. But it is a "legitimate aim of
the anti-dilution statutes to prohibit unauthorized use of another's
trademark in order to market incompatible products or services," a
344. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3946
(1988)).
345. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436,
1467, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
346. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 302, 204
U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 978, 983 (9th Cir. 1979); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical
Dental Surgeries Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401, 403-404 (9th
Cir. 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 189
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1976).
347. Anti-Monopoly, 611 F.2d at 301, 204 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 982.
348. Id.
349. Brownlee, supra note 222, at 480 (citing Wolf, supra note 314, at 316).
350. See Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 815-817, 60 TRADEMARK

REP. at 336-337.
351. Id. at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 342.

352. See also Wolf, supra note 314, at 318 (suggesting a new cause of action
for genericness).
353. Pattishall supra note 15; Denicola, supra note 56, at 166.
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permissible regulation of commercial speech. 3 m There has been
judicial commentary as well as scholarly discussion on the issue of
whether trademark protection intrudes upon first amendment
3 55
rights.
Trademark law gives private parties power to restrict one of the most
basic tools of free expression - words. Kept within its traditional
bounds, this power serves useful functions, protecting consumers
against deception and fraud as well as ensuring producers rewards for
their labor. Over extending that power to protect against dilution and
tarnishment, however,35may jeopardize the richness of free discourse
we so highly treasure.
357
Commentators fear that the courts are not sensitive to the threat.
This concern must be scrutinized carefully, because the situations which are being presented to illustrate the dangers are not
within the realm of the dilution theory's protection. The dilution
protection proposed by Mr. Schechter were never intended to encompass parody and comparison advertising. The dilution theory
was meant to cover the whittling away of the distinctiveness of the
mark.3 5 8 Instead, it is the dilution statute which is being diluted.
There is a constant tension between the trademark owner's interest
in policing and controlling the public's image of his mark, the parodist's desire to ridicule or play with it,-3 9 and the advertiser's ability
to compare his product by use of it. The antidilution statutes and
the dilution cause of action are not the appropriate avenue by which
to obtain relief from damages done by parody or comparison advertising. Any other outcome results in a "dilution" of the very theory
under which protection is being sought.
D. Dilution ProtectionDoes Not Create a Monopoly of Language
The dilution theory has been challenged for failing to have a
built-in or judicially imposed limitation of scope, similar to that of
the likelihood of confusion requirement which limits "a trademark's zone of exclusivity to similar products sold in the same or
similar markets." A critic argues that absent some limitations,
either statutory or judicially imposed, any use of the mark, in any
354. Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1030, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1964 (2d cir. 1989) (citing L.L. Bean, Inc.
v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1013 (1987)).
355. Kravitz, supra note 53, at 135, 79 TRADEMARK REP. at 608.
356. Id. at 180, 79 TRADEMARK REP. at 655-656.
357. Id.
358. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at

342.

359. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment
Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079, reprinted in, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 177 (1987).
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One commentator queries:
[I]f all that is required is the existence of secondary meaning and if the
theory is applicable even where the products are the same, have not we
radically altered the law of trademarks, with trespass superseding deceit as the basis of protection?... [Tihen the rights in secondary meaning marks will be on a parity with government granted patents and the
monopoly of language will
be complete. Does this make sense as a
361
matter of public policy?
This argument claims that the antidilution laws will block a wide
range of speech and result in an abridgement of first amendment
362
rights.
To answer the critics, I would exhort them to focus on the parameters laid down by Mr. Schechter. He minimized the complained of dangers by confining dilution protection to coined,
363
arbitrary, or fanciful marks.
Other proponents would limit it to celebrated marks of undeniable "commercial magnetism."' 364 By focusing on the coined, famous, arbitrary, or fanciful words (as suggested by Mr. Schechter),
we will be protecting words which have been:
[A]dded to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary by their
owners, and have from the very beginning been associated in the public
mind with a particular product, not with a variety of products, and
have created in the public consciousness an impression
or symbol of
365
excellence of the particular product in question.
In foreseeing this attack, Mr. Schechter said: "[a]ll that the plaintiff
in such cases asks is the preservation of a valuable, though possibly
anonymous link between him and his consumer, that has been created by his ingenuity and the merit of his wares or services. 'All the
rest of infinity is open to the defendant.' "366
360. Kravitz, supra note 53, at 142, 79 TRADEMARK REP. at 615 (citing Lucas-

film Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 967 (D.C. D.C.
1985) (plaintiff, producer of film "Star Wars" and licensor of products marketed
under the name, brought an action to enjoin political advocacy groups from using term "Star Wars" to describe a space-based missile defense plan)).
361. Handler, supra note 223, at 278-79.
362. Id. at 283-87 (arguing state antidilution statutes should be considered
preempted because they undermine the Lanham Act's goal of uniformity in
trademark protection).
363. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 829, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at

344.
364. Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra note 210, at 633, 67 TRADEMARK
REP. at 624.
365. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 829, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
344.
366. Id. at 833, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 347 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 Fed. 600, 604 (4th Cir. 1921)).
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IX.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Schechter presented a cogent argument for the dilution
theory. First, he advocates that a trademark functions to identify a
7
product as satisfactory, thereby stimulating further purchases.3
That is to say, to the consuming public the trademark is an indicator
of quality. 368 Today, our law recognizes that trademarks function
as indicators of quality.3 6 9 This function is established by require-

ments for quality control when licensing a mark. The current merchandising trends are manifestations of how willing the public is to
recognize the mark as an indicator of quality and to rely on its goodwill in making the purchase.
Secondly, Mr. Schechter focuses on the damage caused to a
mark when the trademark owner loses control of the quality associated with his mark.3 70 We know it as dilution.3 71 It is an injury
caused by the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name. 37 2 Under
dilution, the damage occurs where the consumer thinking of the
quality experienced with the purchase of the trademark owner's
product purchases the subsequent user's product with the assumption that the second product will have the same quality as the
first.3 7 3

Without the dilution protection

as proposed by Mr.

Schechter, the trademark owner must suffer the risk of the consumer making judgments about the quality of his products based on
the consumer's experience with the subsequent user's product.
Mr. Schechter used the mark KODAK as an example of a
coined and fanciful word;3 74 a mark entitled to protection under his
proposed dilution rationale in 1927.375 At that time KODAK represented film, cameras and photo supplies to consumers. The word
KODAK carried goodwill because of the faith the consumers developed through having consistent experiences with every KODAK
product they purchased. But goodwill is ethereal. Where a trademark owner does not maintain the consistency of his product's qual367. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 818, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
337.
368. Id. at 829, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 344.
369. In Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 681, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1015 (3d Cir. 1989), Judge Becker in his concurrence stated: "I
conclude ... the source theory of trademark protection is no longer viable."
370. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 830, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at
344.
371. Schechter refers to the German term "verwassert" (diluted) when discussing the German 'Odol' decision. Id. at 832, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 346.
372. Id. at 825, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 342.
373. Id. at 831, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 345.
374. Id. at 829, 60 TRADEMARK REP. at 344.

375. Id.
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ity goodwill can disappear. Goodwill exists only with the control of
quality.
Today the mark KODAK represents to consumers not only
film, cameras and photo supplies but also plastics, photocopiers,
computer diskettes, medical equipment, chemical analyzers, and
chemicals and fibers.376 Each of these product lines carries with it
the consumer's expectation of a level of quality. This expectation
arises from the consumer's past experience with the mark KODAK. Should that expectation fail to be met, the mark's goodwill,
as it represents all product lines, would falter and perhaps eventually fail. The swiftness with which goodwill can dissipate means
that only KODAK should have the right and the obligation to control its quality, reputation and goodwill.
The threat of the marketplace makes this a difficult accomplishment. Modern marketing trends have created a predisposition
among consumers to accept famous marks on diverse and unrelated
items. Consumers make their purchasing decisions based on this
predisposition. They purchase items bearing established trademarks expecting to experience the same satisfaction with the newly
licensed product as they did with the established product line. By
way of example, if tomorrow a KODAK motorcycle 377 was introduced into the marketplace consumers would approach their
purchasing decision from what they had experienced with products
bearing the name KODAK. They would start with a level of goodwill, based upon the quality of the established product line.
Two problems then arise when we learn that this motorcycle is
not a product of the KODAK trademark owner but is being offered
in the marketplace by a subsequent user. The first is that the mark
KODAK will no longer mean one body of ideas in the mind of the
consumer (film, cameras.. .) but will also mean motorcycles. The
second is that mark KODAK represents a level of quality to the
consumer. These motorcycles are being manufactured outside of
the control of the trademark owner and without his ability to set or
maintain the level of quality. This is analogous to a licensor who
has granted a "naked license" or fails to maintain quality control the lack of control is deemed an abandonment of the mark. The
fortunes of the goodwill which his mark represents will be outside
of his control and in the hands of the subsequent user.
376. Eastman Kodak, Annual Report 1984.
377. Mr. Schechter used KODAK as an example of a coined, arbitrary, or

fanciful word. Schechter, Rational Basis, supra note 2, at 828, 60 TRADEMARK
REP. at 344. He cited, in note 76, to a British case Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak
Cycle Co., 15 R.P.C. 105 (1898), wherein the court protected the trademark KODAK from being used on bicycles. See also Derenberg, supra note 68.
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Mr. Schechter proposed his "Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection" to prevent the harms that occur when a famous mark is
used on dissimilar goods; the loss of the distinctive nature of the
mark and, more importantly, the loss of control over the quality
associated with his mark. Without control of quality there is no
goodwill, and without goodwill there is no trademark to be protected. I would urge my colleagues to more closely examine the
merits of the- dilution theory when pursuing the protection of famous marks. Mr. Schechter was correct. A dilution cause of action
is the "only rational basis of trademark protection."

